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INTRODUCTION
In November of 1934, former Louisiana Governor James A. Noe,
along with several associates, formed the Win or Lose Corporation “to
acquire, sell, trade and exchange lands and leases for the drilling and
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prospecting for oil, gas and other minerals . . . .”2 In the following years,
the Win or Lose Corporation acquired interests in several mineral leases
on land owned by the State of Louisiana, some of which are still in
operation today. For the past eighty-two years, the former governors and
their descendants and assigns profited off of the lessees’ shares of royalties
paid from these State mineral leases. However, this profiting has been
perceived by some to be the result of an unjust enrichment by a select few
politically, connected individuals to the financial detriment of the State of
Louisiana.3
As a result of these perceptions and a recent resurgence in interest in
these leases, the State Mineral and Energy Board requested that the
Louisiana Attorney General analyze allegations of wrongdoing
surrounding Win or Lose’s involvement in these leases. In 2013, the
Louisiana Attorney General’s Office published a report on the issue.4 This
article serves as a modified, updated, and scaled-down version of that
report, and is intended to preserve the analysis of these matters in an
accessible format for posterity. Included in this article is a review of the
historical context of this matter, a review of past litigation of, and
investigations into, the Win or Lose matter, and a comprehensive analysis
of the legality and validity of what have become known as the Win or Lose
leases under the law in force at the time that the leases were granted. This
analysis leads to the conclusion that the leases were granted in accordance
with the law in force at the time of their issuance and that the State received
(and continues to receive) its legally mandated royalty share of minerals
produced from these leases and, in some cases, more. No evidence has
been identified or discovered to support any theory or claim that the Win
or Lose leases were illegally obtained or that they have been unlawfully
held. In addition, no evidence has been identified to suggest that the former
governors or their heirs and assigns are or have historically received any
royalties or other funds from these leases that should have been paid to the
State. Finally, this analysis has identified no legal basis for the rescission
or cancellation of the Win or Lose leases and has determined that such a
rescission or cancellation, were it legally available, would not be in the
best interests of the State of Louisiana. In fact, this analysis indicates that
2. Articles of Incorporation of Win or Lose Corporation 2 (Nov. 21, 1934)
(on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
3. See, e.g., Lee Zurik, Lee Zurik Investigation: ‘Dirty Deeds’ Cost Louisiana
Hundreds of Millions, Fox 8 WVUE, Aug. 7, 2013, fox8live.com/story/18067615
/lee-zurik-investigation-dirty-deeds-cost-louisiana-hundreds-of-millions [https:
//perma.cc/T73F-H9VK], aired Aug. 7, 2013 [hereafter Zurik one].
4. See RYAN M. SEIDEMANN, ETHEL S. GRAHAM, WILLIAM T. HAWKINS,
STEVEN B. JONES & FREDERIC AUGONNET, LA. ATT’Y GEN., AN ANALYSIS OF THE
LEGALITY AND VIABILITY OF MINERAL LEASES GRANTED TO W.T. BURTON AND
JAMES A. NOE DURING THE YEARS 1934–1936 (2013).
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such legal action would be unsuccessful and would actually be detrimental
to the interests of the State.
I. WHAT IS WIN OR LOSE CORPORATION?
The Win or Lose Corporation (herein referred to as Win or Lose) was
founded on November 20, 1934. According to its Articles of
Incorporation, its purpose is to “acquire, sell, or exchange lands and leases
for the drilling and prospecting of oil, gas, and other minerals . . . .”5 The
president of the corporation is listed as James A. Noe of Monroe,
Louisiana; the vice-president as Seymour Weiss; and the secretarytreasurer as Earle Christenberry.6 The initial capital stock of the
corporation included a ten thousand dollar investment, comprised of one
hundred shares.7 According to later documents, Seymour Weiss and Earle
Christenberry only held one share each, with the remaining ninety-eight
shares being held by James A. Noe.8
The question of the corporation’s alleged impropriety stems from: (1)
the relationship between Win or Lose and then-current and former State
government officials; and (2) the subsequent transfer of shares to Senator
Huey P. Long and Governor Oscar K. Allen, as well as several other select
individuals.9 Specifically, as to the corporation’s officers, James A. Noe,
the president of Win or Lose Corporation, was Louisiana’s Governor for
three and a half months,10 following the unexpected death in office of
Oscar K. Allen;11 Seymour Weiss was one of Huey P. Long’s oldest
confidants and managed his campaign war chests;12 and Earle
Christenberry was Huey Long’s personal secretary.13
The individuals that played a role in the Win or Lose Corporation’s
history are legendary in Louisiana. It is their infamous nature that has
5. Articles of Incorporation of Win or Lose Corporation 2 (Nov. 21, 1034)
(on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. Trial Transcript at 92, United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070)
(citing testimony of Earle J. Christenberry) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice)
[hereinafter United States v. Noe Trial Transcript]; see also T. HARRY WILLIAMS,
HUEY LONG 825 (Knopf 1970).
9. See, e.g., Zurik one, supra note 3.
10. Noe had also served as the Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana and as a
State Senator. Alex McManus, The Political Career of James A. Noe 11 (M.A.
Thesis, Univ. of La. at Monroe 2005) (copy on file with author).
11. Id. at 44.
12. RICHARD D. WHITE, KINGFISH: THE REIGN OF HUEY P. LONG 80
(Random House 2006).
13. WILLIAM IVY HAIR, THE KINGFISH AND HIS REALM 232 (La. State Univ.
Press 1991).
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colored perceptions of the validity of the mineral leases that ultimately
ended up as partially held by those individuals and the corporation over
the years. Yet, as noted by historian J. Eric Pardue, the Win or Lose
Corporation’s involvement in mineral leasing from the State of Louisiana
was “of questionable morality but complete legality.”14
Also apparent in the historical treatment of the Win or Lose
Corporation is a tendency for temporal relationships among and between
activities to be ignored or otherwise glossed over. Pardue provides an
important example of this, commenting that, “the thirty-one shares Noe
gave Huey earned $62[,000] for the governor in the first year of
ownership.”15 Although the amounts in this quotation may be correct, the
quote implies that Long was governor when the shares and money were
received. However, he was not. In fact, the Win or Lose Corporation was
not formed until two years after the end of Long’s only term as governor.16
Thus, the implication that Long, as a sitting governor, was given shares of
a corporation making money from State leases is simply incorrect.17
Indeed, as Earle Christenberry later testified in the tax evasion trial of
James A. Noe, the Longs gained their title ownership interest in the Win
or Lose Corporation by way of a stock issuance to Mrs. Huey P. Long in
1936.18 Yet, Christenberry also testified that Long had held one of the
stock certificates issued to Noe—thirty-one shares—during his lifetime
and that the same was part of Long’s succession.19 According to
Christenberry, Oscar K. Allen also held a stock certificate issued to Noe—
twelve shares—during his lifetime and those stocks were part of Allen’s
14. J. Eric Pardue, Jimmie, Huey, Sam, and Earl: Longism in James A. Noe’s
1940 Gubernatorial Campaign, in 37 NORTH LOUISIANA HISTORY 102, 105 (2006).
15. Id. at 104–05.
16. Huey P. Long served as Governor of Louisiana from 1928–1932. LA.
SEC’Y OF STATE, Governors from 1877-Present, sos.la.gov/historicalresources
/aboutlouisiana/louisianagovernors1877-present/Pages/default.aspx [https:
//perma.cc/S76S-3EWQ].
17. It should be noted, however, that O.K. Allen was a sitting governor when
he received shares in Win or Lose, and James A. Noe was a sitting Louisiana State
Senator and lieutenant governor when he received shares of Win or Lose.
18. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 104–05 (citing
testimony of Earle J. Christenberry). This is not to suggest that Huey Long did
not have a substantial role in the formation of the company just prior to his death.
He did. According to the testimony of Alfred D. Danziger, Huey Long was present
at the signing of the Win or Lose charter in 1934 and, though he was not an owner
of the company, he certainly provided advice to James A. Noe regarding the
original development of State Lease 309. For the former, see id. at 86–87 (citing
testimony of Alfred D. Danziger). For the latter, see id. at 49–54 (citing testimony
of Leonard M. Levy).
19. Id. at 105–06 (citing testimony of Earle J. Christenberry). This reality is
corroborated by the information in Huey P. Long’s succession. See Succession of
Huey P. Long (Orl. Parish, 1938) (No. 215-671) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
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succession.20 In fact, although the original incorporators are shown as
James A. Noe, Seymour Weiss, and Earle J. Christenberry, IRS
Intelligence Agent Frank W. Lohn succinctly summarized the ownership
of the Win or Lose Corporation in his testimony in the matter of U.S. v.
Noe:21
Mr. Noe said that when the company was first organized, he
owned [ninety-eight] shares, Mr. Weiss, one share and Mr.
Christenberry, one share, that immediately afterwards the stock
was split up so that Senator Long owned [thirty-one] shares, he
[Noe] owned [thirty-one] shares, Mr. Weiss [twenty-four] shares,
Governor Allen [twelve] shares, and Mrs. Alice Lee Grosjean, one
share, and Mr. Christenberry, one share.22
Lohn’s recitation of the division of Win or Lose Corporation shares
was later supported by Earle J. Christenberry’s testimony in the same
trial.23
Further, when academic sources such as Jeansonne comment that,
“[p]rofits that should have gone to the state went to Long and his
cronies,”24 it is not surprising that the public and press often develop
misconceptions regarding whether the State received what it was due
under the Win or Lose leases.25 The “profits” to which Jeansonne refers
are monies realized by the Win or Lose Corporation for the royalties,
assignments, or subleases of State mineral leases. The issuance of such
assignments and subleases by lessees were not, as is examined below,
20. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 106–07 (citing
testimony of Earle J. Christenberry). This reality is corroborated by Oscar K. Allen’s
succession. See Succession of Oscar Kelly Allen (La. 8th J.D.C. 1936) (No. 777)
(listing certificate for twelve shares of the Win or Lose Corporation transferred to O.K.
Allen under the personal property section of the succession inventory).
21. As set forth more fully below, the matter of United States v. Noe was a
tax evasion trial brought against James Noe, Seymour Weiss, and the Win or Lose
Corporation by the federal government.
22. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 248 (citing
testimony of Frank W. Lohn).
23. See id. at 92 (citing testimony of Earle J. Christenberry).
24. GLEN JEANSONNE, MESSIAH TO THE MASSES: HUEY P. LONG AND THE
GREAT DEPRESSION 160 (Harper Collins 1993).
25. A classic example of such misconceptions was published in THE
ADVOCATE:
[Huey] Long held shares in the Win or Lose Corp., which leased mineral
rights on state-owned property. The leases did not cost Win or Lose
anything because they were turned over to the company by the governor.
Editorial, Huey: The ‘[O]ther’ Long, THE ADVOCATE, Aug. 26, 2013, at 12C. As
is seen herein, Huey Long did own shares of Win or Lose; Win or Lose also held
rights in State mineral leases. However, none of the leases, as is developed herein
were given at no cost to the company by any governor.
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unlawful activities, and the financial benefits of those activities were not
supposed to be escheated to the State. The assumption in Jeansonne’s
statement is that, had the State retained the Win or Lose leased areas and,
in turn, successfully leased those areas on its own, then the State would
have received a higher original lease amount. Thus, this statement assumes
at least two events, neither of which occurred, in order to support a belief
that profits were misappropriated to the Long political machine.26 Further,
because the assigning or subleasing lessee would retain any profits
realized from assignments of subleases, the State would not have realized
any of those funds in any event. Thus, an inflammatory statement that the
State was swindled out of large sums of money is based on two
assumptions and an incorrect understanding of the law—a troubling reality
for an academic publication.
A. Huey P. Long
Huey P. Long served as the fortieth Governor of Louisiana from 1928
to 1932. Subsequently, he was elected to the United States Senate and
served in that capacity until his assassination in 1935.27 Long went from
relative obscurity in Winn Parish to notoriety as the self-titled “Kingfish”
of Louisiana. Numerous biographies and innumerable articles detail the

26. The assumed events are that the State would have otherwise attempted to
and successfully would have leased these same areas to someone other than the
Win or Lose interests and that such leases would have garnered more from the
State than the Win or Lose leases.
27. WHITE, supra note 12, at ix.
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life and political career of Huey Long,28 making a comprehensive review
here redundant. His political career began with his election to the
Louisiana Railroad Commission in 1918 on a populist platform from
which he would never fully step away.29 Later, Long ran for governor in
1924 but lost.30 Undeterred, he ran again in 1928 and won.31 Once in
office, Long quickly consolidated his political power by means of
nepotism, legal maneuvering, and outright bullying.32 Historians continue
to debate Long’s motivations, but the means by which he accomplished
his goals is less debatable. In this regard, Long’s Louisiana is widely
analogized in the historical literature to a dictatorship in which
intimidation and suppression was often used to ensure that Long’s plans
were effectuated. A common theme in historical circles is that, under
Long’s political control, Louisiana no longer resembled a democracy;
instead, all matters of the State were vested in one individual and were
dependent upon his whims and moods.33
Long’s control of Louisiana was near absolute,34 and the men who
were the founders of the Win or Lose venture made up his closest circle.35
28. See, e.g., LOUISIANA POLITICS: FESTIVAL IN A LABYRINTH (James Bolner ed.,
1982); Henry C. Dethloff, The Longs: Revolution or Populist Retrenchment?, in 19
LOUISIANA HISTORY 401–12 (1978); LA. STATE MUSEUM, HUEY PIERCE LONG: THE
MARTYR OF THE AGE (James Joseph Alcée Fortier ed., 1937); HUEY LONG (Hugh
Davis Graham ed., 1970); Edward F. Haas, Huey Pierce Long and Historical
Speculation, in 27 THE HISTORY TEACHER 125 (1994); HAIR, supra note 13; THOMAS
O. HARRIS, THE KINGFISH: HUEY P. LONG, DICTATOR (Pelican Publ’g Co. 1938);
ELMER L. IREY & WILLIAM J. SLOCUM, THE TAX DODGERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE T-MEN’S WAR WITH AMERICA’S POLITICAL AND UNDERWORLD HOODLUMS
(1948); Glen Jeansonne, Huey P. Long: A Political Contradiction, in 31 LOUISIANA
HISTORY 373 (1990); Glen Jeansonne, Huey P. Long, Gerald L. K. Smith and Leander
H. Perez as Charismatic Leaders, in 35 LOUISIANA HISTORY 5 (1994); HUEY AT 100:
CENTENNIAL ESSAYS ON HUEY P. LONG (Glen Jeansonne ed., 1995); HARNETT T.
KANE, HUEY LONG’S LOUISIANA HAYRIDE: THE AMERICAN REHEARSAL FOR
DICTATORSHIP 1928–1940 (Pelican Publ’g Co. 1971); REINHARD H. LUTHIN,
AMERICAN DEMAGOGUES: TWENTIETH CENTURY (1954); ROBERT MANN, LEGACY
TO POWER: SENATOR RUSSELL LONG OF LOUISIANA (Paragon House 1992); ALLAN
P. SINDLER, HUEY LONG’S LOUISIANA: STATE POLITICS, 1920–1952 (Johns Hopkins
Press 1956); WEBSTER SMITH, THE KINGFISH: A BIOGRAPHY OF HUEY LONG (1933);
Courtney Vaughn, The Legacy of Huey Long, in 20 LOUISIANA HISTORY 93 (1979);
WILLIAMS, supra note 8; T. Harry Williams, The Gentleman from Louisiana:
Demagogue or Democrat, in 26 JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 3–21 (1960);
WHITE, supra note 12.
29. HAIR, supra note 13, at 86–88. The Louisiana Railroad Commission is
now known as the Louisiana Public Service Commission.
30. WHITE, supra note 12, at 18.
31. Id. at 35–36.
32. Id. at 39, 45.
33. See, e.g., id. at 125.
34. For details, see HAIR, supra note 13, at 276–97.
35. Namely, James Noe, Seymour Weiss, and Earle Christenberry.
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Long was neither a founder nor an original shareholder of Win or Lose
Corporation, but he clearly knew the details of the company’s formation,
methods, and purposes.36 In fact, despite the interest that Long held in the
company, his name does not show up on the Win or Lose paperwork until
after his death in 1935.37
B. Oscar K. Allen
At the time during which the Win or Lose Corporation was founded,
the State of Louisiana was under a “Long dictatorship.”38 Although by
1934, Huey P. Long was a United States Senator, where he continued to
exercise substantial power in Baton Rouge.39 It is now widely accepted
that Long had largely installed Oscar K. Allen as the then-current governor
knowing that he could control Allen and thereby maintain control over
Louisiana. Thus, Long would hold both a position as a Senator, and
influence over the gubernatorial office.40
Oscar K. Allen served as Governor of Louisiana from 1932 to 1936,
following Huey Long’s term. Allen was a boyhood friend of Long, and
Long appointed him as the head of the Highway Commission early in
Long’s gubernatorial term.41 Long later handpicked Allen to run for
governor after him.42 As noted by both White and Williams, Allen’s only
qualification for governor consisted of his obedience to Huey Long.43 Earl
K. Long, commenting on Allen’s willingness to do Huey Long’s bidding,
stated that if “[a] leaf blew in the window of Allen’s office and fell on his
desk[,] [h]e signed it,” thinking that it was something from Huey that
needed approval.44 Later, Allen was elected to the United States Senate
after Long’s death, but suffered a brain hemorrhage and died in the
governor’s mansion on January 25, 1936.45

36. See Articles of Incorporation of Win or Lose Corporation 3–5 (Nov. 21,
1934) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
37. See Interview by Michael Gillette with Earle J. Christenberry (Nov. 4,
1970), in Jack B. McGuire Papers, within DAVID R. MCGUIRE MEMORIAL
COLLECTION. The interview can be located in the Manuscript Collections 271,
Series 4, Box 1, Folder 34 in the Louisiana Research Collection of the HowardTilton Memorial Library at Tulane University.
38. See HAIR, supra note 13, at 279–80.
39. Long’s only term as governor ended on January 25, 1932.
40. WHITE, supra note 12, at 135.
41. Id. at 41, 102.
42. Id. at 135–36.
43. See generally WHITE, supra note 12; WILLIAMS, supra note 8.
44. HAIR, supra note 13, at 240.
45. WHITE, supra note 12, at 304.
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C. James A. Noe
James A. Noe, though raised in Indiana, moved to Monroe, Louisiana,
and established himself as a prominent oilman, politician, and one of the
primary financial backers of Huey P. Long.46 Further, Noe was also the
primary shareholder in and one of the founders of the Win or Lose
Corporation.
Noe was working as a drilling supervisor when he met Long, who was
an attorney representing an injured worker at the time.47 The two instantly
connected, bonding over a similar background and upbringing. In 1932,
Long persuaded Noe to run for Louisiana State Senator. After he won, Noe
was immediately appointed President Pro Tempore of the Senate.48 Later
in 1934, Noe was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana at Long’s
request.49
When Governor Allen suffered a brain hemorrhage, Noe, then
Lieutenant Governor, became governor, albeit only for a fourteen-week
lame duck governorship.50 During his brief tenure as governor, Noe made
several shrewd political decisions that would help him later in his career,
but otherwise did nothing politically of note. It was during this brief time,
however, that Noe granted the several mineral leases to William T. Burton
that are the subject of this article. Importantly, despite the fact that
Governor Noe actually granted the leases to W.T. Burton, application for
those leases was made during Governor Allen’s tenure. This made Noe’s
involvement in the actual leasing largely ministerial.51
Although Noe attempted to break back into politics on a few more
occasions, the remainder of his life was largely focused on his business
interests, which included oil and gas assets—some of which derived from
his association with Win or Lose—and media assets. Noe ultimately died
in 1976.

46. McManus, supra, note 10.
47. McManus, supra note 10, at 10.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id. at 12.
50. See Lame Duck, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “Lame duck”
is defined as “[a]n official, esp[ecially] an elected one, whose power has waned
because his or her term of office will end soon; esp[ecially], an elected official serving
out a term after a successor has been elected.” This is an appropriate characterization
of James Noe’s governorship, as he was finishing Oscar Allen’s soon-ending term and
he had not been elected to the position in his own right.
51. See A.J. Gray, III, Annotation, An Analysis of the Legality and Viability of
Mineral Leases Granted to W.T. Burton and James A. Noe During the Years 1934–
1936, at 14–15 (2015) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Gray Annotation].
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D. William T. Burton
William Thomas Burton, more commonly referred to as W.T. Burton,
was a self-made businessman who started with a grocery store in Sulphur,
Louisiana. Later, he became one of the most successful industrialists and
philanthropists of Calcasieu Parish.52 He was chairman of the Calcasieu
Marine National Bank and president of William T. Burton Industries of
Sulphur—a company focused on oil and mineral investments.53 For the
purposes of this article, Burton was also involved with the Win or Lose
Corporation by leasing land from the State for mineral exploration and
production, and then assigning54 substantial interests in those leases to the
Win or Lose Corporation.55 Based upon the documents available at this
time, it does not appear, nor has any new evidence been identified to
suggest, that Burton was a stockholder in the Win or Lose Corporation.56

52. ERBON W. WISE, BRIMSTONE!: THE HISTORY OF SULPHUR, LOUISIANA,
1878–1980, 107 (Southwest Builder News 1981).
53. KATHIE BORDELON, MCNEESE STATE UNIVERSITY, 18 (Arcadia Publ’g
2001).
54. An “assignment” in this context is defined as, “a transfer of rights in real
or personal property or rights under a contract—for example, the transfer of an oil
and gas lease from the original lessee to others.” UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN,
PETROLEUM EXTENSION SERV., A DICTIONARY FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
13 (1st ed.) (Susan Toalson ed., 2005). See also HOWARD R. WILLIAMS &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 30 (4th ed.) (Matthew
Bender 1976).
55. It is important to note that, contrary to some media allegations suggesting
that Burton was new to mineral leasing at the time of the Win or Lose Corporation
activities that are the subject of this report, mineral activities were merely another
part of Burton’s industrial pursuits. His activities in this area long predated the
Win or Lose Corporation. See Zurik one, supra note 3, at 1 (stating, incorrectly,
that Burton was “a Lake Charles businessman with little to no experience in
drilling oil.”). In fact, Burton first acquired a mineral lease from the State in 1920
(State Lease 42), which was fourteen years before the Win or Lose Corporation
was even formed. See State Lease 42 (Oct. 20, 1920) (awarding the lease to Burton
under authority of Governor John M. Parker) (on file with the La. Dep’t of
Justice). When asked this question during the U.S. v. Noe trial in 1942, Burton
noted that he had been in the oil business “ever since–the Spindle top . . . maybe
thirty-five years or better.” United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at
186 (citing testimony of William T. Burton). It is also important to note that
Burton did not always prevail when he was a bidder on State mineral leases. In
fact, one example of such an unsuccessful bid occurred during the Noe
administration, where Burton was outbid by Shell on a lease at the same lease sale
as State Lease 340. Shell High Bidder on State Lease, OIL NEWS OF THE
SOUTHWEST (Feb. 20, 1936). See also Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 10.
56. See Articles of Incorporation of Win or Lose Corporation 3 (Nov. 21, 1934)
(on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). This supposition is corroborated by A.J. Gray,
III, an attorney to W.T. Burton. See Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 16.
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Few of the major political biographies or monographs related to
Louisiana even mention Burton. He seems to have kept a low profile, as
he never ran for political office nor was he directly involved in Louisiana
politics. Although Burton was on the receiving end of two Internal
Revenue Service tax evasion trials and an additional trial for jury
tampering, the latter of which garnered him a two-year stint in the
penitentiary,57 he is fondly remembered in his home, Calcasieu Parish.
Indeed, several buildings at McNeese State University are named in his
honor: The Burton Business Center and the Burton Coliseum.58
Additionally, the William T. Burton and Ethel Lewis Burton Foundation
award scholarships to outstanding, graduating high school students in the
Lake Charles area.59 W.T. Burton died in 1974.
E. Earle Christenberry
Earle Christenberry was Huey Long’s private secretary and an
influential man behind the scenes of the Huey Long administration and the
subsequent Longite administrations.60 In a letter to J. Edgar Hoover, FBI
Special Agent Sackett describes Christenberry as, “a very good student of
Politics . . . a level-headed, capable young man.”61 Because Christenberry
largely operated in the background of other prominent individuals, little
biographical information is available; however, it is known that he was
born in New Orleans and grew up in a working class family.62 Further, his
brother, Herbert W. Christenberry, served as a judge in the federal court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana from 1949 to 1975.63 Earle
Christenberry faded from public view not long after Long’s death.
Nonetheless, Earle Christenberry lived until 1980.
F. Seymour Weiss
Seymour Weiss was a prominent New Orleans businessman, a
manager turned owner of the fabled Roosevelt Hotel, and one of Huey
57. 19-Year-Old Tax Dispute Settled, William T. Burton to Pay U.S.
$635,000, TIMES-PICAYUNE 1 (Nov. 16, 1954).
58. BORDELON, supra note 53, at 19.
59. WISE, supra note 52 at 107.
60. Letter from B.E. Sackett, Special Agent, to J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Director
(May 22, 1939) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
61. Id. at 2.
62. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, History of the Federal Judiciary:
Biographies: Herbert W. Christenberry, https://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page
/tu_bush_bio _christenberry.html [https://perma.cc/KEG9-6623] (last accessed Oct.
9, 2016).
63. Id.
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Long’s closest confidants.64 Weiss was the treasurer for Huey Long’s
campaign and was active behind the scenes of the Long administration.65
In 1929, the Louisiana House of Representatives summoned Weiss to give
testimony regarding certain expenditures that the anti-Long faction
believed had been used by Huey Long for drinking and girls. Weiss, in a
spectacular display of loyalty to Long, refused to answer any questions
regarding the money.66 Weiss remained Long’s steadfast friend and
business partner, sharing in the successes of the Win or Lose venture.
Moreover, to illustrate how close the two were, Weiss was one of those at
Long’s bedside when the latter died. Weiss died in 1969.
II. HISTORIC CONTROVERSIES
The Win or Lose Corporation and the involvement of its officers or
shareholders in various mineral leases from the State of Louisiana have
been controversial virtually since the corporation’s inception. This section
reviews both the legal disputes related to these matters as well as the
media’s historial treatment of these issues.
A. Review of All Known Legal Cases Filed, Their Outcomes, and Their
Impact on any Current or Future Action.
A total of seven lawsuits were identified as having been filed related
to one or more of the matters surrounding the Win or Lose Corporation.
Only one such case, Roussel v. Noe, to be discussed below, actually
focused on the issues involved in this article, but the other suits, save one,
are contextually relevant.67
1. State v. Noe (La. 19th J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,112)
In State v. Noe, a writ of mandamus was brought seeking an order
directing then-Governor James A. Noe to cancel State Lease 335, which
was issued by Governor Oscar K. Allen to W.T. Burton on January 23,
1936.68 This suit was brought by the Land Investment Company, Inc. on
March 27, 1936, who alleged that former Governor Allen unlawfully
64. WHITE, supra note 12, at 80.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 81.
67. The one suit tangentially related to this matter, but of no substantive
importance, is the matter of Daspit v. State (La. 19th J.D.C. 1954) (No. 23,833) (on
file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). This was a case regarding payment of certain
attorneys from an earlier case related to this matter and is not reviewed here.
68. See Petition of State ex rel. Land Inv. Co., Inc., State v. Noe (La. 19th
J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,112) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
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ignored its nomination of certain acreage to be advertised for bidding.69
This same acreage later made up a small portion of a nomination by W.T.
Burton. In its Petition, the State acknowledged that Governor Allen
advertised Burton’s nomination for bidding and that Burton ultimately
submitted the winning bid.70 This nominated area became State Lease 335.
Land Investment Company, Inc. alleged injury due to Governor Allen’s
failure to advertise the acreage for bidding upon its application because,
although Burton’s nomination included the same area, it was for such a
large swath of land that Land Investment Company, Inc. was financially
unable to bid.71 Following the filing of this litigation, minimal activity
occurred in the court record—the filing of exceptions and answers. The
case eventually settled on May 28, 1936, and a judgment approving the
compromise was entered on June 1, 1936.72 However, no copy of the
settlement exists in the court record or in the State lease record.73
This case does not have a res judicata effect on any theory that the
State or a private party might use to challenge this lease today. However,
it is important to note that a review of the law in force at the time that State
Lease 335 was issued reveals that, had this matter gone to trial on the
mandamus issue, it would have failed. The mandamus relief sought in this
matter assumes that Governor Allen was legally obligated to advertise any
nomination of State property for mineral leasing. If this were the case, as
a mandatory and ministerial (i.e., nondiscretionary) act, Allen was
required to advertise the acreage nominated by Land Investment
Company, Inc., upon its application on July 3, 1935. Following this
argument to its end, Allen’s failure to advertise Land Investment
Company, Inc.’s nomination allowed W.T. Burton to later nominate the
same property—albeit as part of a much larger nomination—bid on it, and
69. Id. ¶ 4.
70. Id. ¶ 7.
71. Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
72. Judgment, ¶ 2, State v. Noe (La. 19th J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,112) (on file
with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
73. Commenting on the outcome of this litigation, an attorney for W.T.
Burton, A.J. Gray, III, stated:
The Minutes of a meeting of Win or Lose Corporation dated May 28,
1936 . . . reflect that the compromise with Land Investment Company,
Inc. was for payment to Land Investment Company, Inc. of $5,000.00
plus a 1/48th overriding royalty under State Lease 335. According to the
minutes, the 1/48th overriding royalty was one-half of the 1/24th
overriding royalty Burton reserved in his sublease of State Lease 335 to
The Texas Company. According to the minutes, Burton and The Texas
Company agreed to pay the $5,000.00, and Burton agreed to convey
1/8th of the 1/24th overriding royalty while Win or Lose Corporation
agreed to convey 3/8th of the 1/24th overriding royalty.
Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 20–21.
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receive the State lease for the property. However, the law in force at the
time of this activity—Acts 1915, No. 3074—specifically makes the
advertisement for bidding of any nominated property discretionary for the
governor.75 The discretionary authority of an elected official cannot be
compelled by way of mandamus.76 Thus, although Governor Allen failed
to exercise his discretion to advertise Land Investment Company, Inc.’s
nomination for what became State Lease 335, Governor Noe had no
obligation to cancel that lease.
For this reason, while this case is instructive on the question of
whether governors in the 1930s had the discretion to or not act on certain
nominations, it is not an indictment of the letting of State Lease 335. Based
on Governor Allen’s statutory authority at the time, he was authorized to
reject nominations and could not be compelled to advertise each
nomination for bid.
2. State v. Noe (La. 19th J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,126)
This case involved another mandamus proceeding against thenGovernor James A. Noe by a losing bidder for State Lease 321. State Lease
321 was granted on January 23, 1936 by then-Governor Oscar K. Allen to
W.T. Burton. The problem alleged in this action was that when the original
lease was issued, it was not properly advertised.77 Although the lease was
advertised in other parishes, it was not advertised in the official journal of
the parish in which the land was situated, Caddo Parish.78 As a result, the
lease, subsequent to its issuance, was properly readvertised. The
complaining party in this case, C.M. Brenner, alleged that his bid,
submitted pursuant to the advertised lease term—one year—was more
advantageous to the State than Burton’s bid for a two-year term.79 Further,
74. As amended by Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606-07 and Act No. 9, 1930
La. Acts 27 (passed by the 1928 Extraordinary Legislative Session) (currently LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:126 (2009)).
75. This reality is so because of the “may” language in the following excerpt:
[T]he Governor of the State may cause the Register of the State Land
Office to make an inspection of the land sought to be leased, and . . . .
the Governor may cause to be published in the official journal of the state
. . . a description of the land to be leased [by the State] . . . .
Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 62 (emphasis added).
76. Badger v. City of New Orleans, 21 So. 870, 872 (La. 1897) (“The mandamus
issues only to enforce the purely ministerial duty imposed by law.”); see also Cook v.
City of Shreveport, 112 So. 402, 404 (La. 1927); State ex rel. City of New Orleans v.
La. Highway Comm’n, 156 So. 806, 810 (La. 1934).
77. See Petition of State ex rel. C.M. Brenner, ¶ 3, State v. Noe (La. 19th
J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,126) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
78. Id.
79. Id. at ¶¶ 6–9.
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Brenner alleged that because the advertisement sought a bid for a one-year
term and Burton’s bid was for a two-year term, he had submitted the only
bid in conformity with the advertisement and therefore, the lease should
have been awarded to him.80
This matter reached the Louisiana Supreme Court in State ex rel.
Brenner v. Noe.81 Nevertheless, the court did not rule on whether an
acceptance of a two-year lease is legally permissible when the actual
advertisement only called for a one-year lease. Thus, this question remains
unresolved as to this lease. Regardless, State Lease 321 is no longer active,
hence making any further inquiry into the validity of the lease moot.
Further, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted:
[a]s the obligations of the lessee have been fully complied with
under the terms of the lease, the lease has become an executed
contract. The State has accepted the benefits of the lease for
several years in receiving the sum of $500, paid by the lessee as
bonus and rentals, and neither law, equity nor good conscience
will allow the State to claim the benefits and at the same time
escape its obligations under the lease.82
In other words, because the State accepted the benefits of this lease
during its existence, the State cannot later challenge the same lease for
irregularities in the advertisements of the lease. This is an important
problem for any current challenges to any Win or Lose leases, as the State
has undoubtedly accepted the benefits—such as royalties—from all of the
Win or Lose leases. Accordingly, the passage of time and, more
importantly, the acceptance of the benefits of the lease, have now
effectively barred the State from challenging this lease based on the
advertised lease term issue.
3. United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070)
U.S. v. Noe involved a federal income tax evasion matter brought by the
United States against James A. Noe, Seymour Weiss, and the Win or Lose
Corporation.83 The federal government alleged that the named defendants
had concealed certain income information in order to avoid the imposition
of income taxes, and had thus violated and conspired to violate the Internal
80. Id. at ¶ 10.
81. 171 So. 708 (La. 1936).
82. Reeves v. Leche, 195 So. 542, 545 (La. 1940). See also State ex rel. Shell Oil
Co. v. Register of the State Land Office, 192 So. 519, 520 (La. 1939).
83. See United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070) (on file with the
La. Dep’t of Justice).
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Revenue Code. On October 3, 1940, the court returned an indictment
against the defendants, charging them with violations of the Internal
Revenue Code.84 Following the indictment, the United States filed a
criminal case against the defendants on October 8, 1940 in the Eastern
District of Louisiana.85 Weiss, alone, pled guilty. The imposition of his
sentence was suspended and Weiss was placed on probation for a period
of five years. On the other hand, both, Noe and the Win or Lose
Corporation pled not guilty.
During the trial, Noe was questioned regarding certain deposits and
payments made to the Win or Lose Corporation. To most of these
questions, Noe responded that he had no recollection of specific
transactions.86 He did provide that one payment to former Governor Allen
was a gift rather than the payment of dividends.87 He also stated that
former Governor Long was never issued any shares of stock in Win or
Lose Corporation.88 Notably, both statements have proven to be incorrect,
as was revealed by the testimony of various individuals in the 1942 trial.89
Nonetheless, on April 11, 1942, a jury returned not guilty verdicts
against Noe and Win or Lose on all four counts of attempted tax evasion.90
Although this case is related to the Win or Lose Corporation, it provides
no real legal insight into the matter being reviewed here, except to confirm
certain facts. Further, it has no legal bearing on any claims that the State
or a taxpaying plaintiff may have today in challenging any Win or Lose
activities.
4. State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No. 22,664)
State v. Burton, filed on October 5, 1943 against W.T. Burton in
Calcasieu Parish, challenged the validity of State Lease 318 and certain

84. See Indictment, United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070), (Oct. 3,
1940) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
85. See id.
86. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 3–5 (citing sworn
statement of James A. Noe given on Nov. 4, 1937).
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 10–11. This same statement was made by Earle Christenberry some
thirty years later in a private interview. See Interview by Michael Gillette with Earle
J. Christenberry (Nov. 4, 1970), in Jack B. McGuire Papers, within DAVID R.
MCGUIRE MEMORIAL COLLECTION. The interview can be located in the Manuscript
Collections 271, Series 4, Box 1, Folder 34 in the Louisiana Research Collection of
the Howard-Tilton Memorial Library at Tulane University.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 165
(noting that Governor Allen held stock in Win or Lose Corporation).
90. See Jury Verdict, United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070),
(Apr. 11, 1942) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
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actions related to that lease subsequent to its issuance.91 Specifically, the
suit, filed by the State Mineral Board in the name of the State of Louisiana
(the suit subsequently was amended to add the State Mineral Board as an
actual co-plaintiff) alleged that: (1) certain assignments to The Texas
Company and the Win or Lose Corporation were invalid for Win or Lose’s
failure to record and pay consideration for those assignments;92 (2) those
assignments were further invalid because then-Governor Oscar K. Allen,
as a stockholder of the Win or Lose Corporation, received a benefit from
the assignments;93 (3) the interests of The Texas Company and the Win or
Lose Corporation were reassigned to Burton to avoid the necessity of
paying delay rentals;94 (4) State Lease 318 was invalid because it did not
contain a “reasonable development clause” but rather “unusual,
unfavorable, inequitable, and unconscionable” terms for the State; thus,
Burton’s bid should have been rejected;95 (5) State Lease 318 had, at that
time, kept State land out of commerce for eight years—with an indefinite
term—and it was illegal, null and void, and violative of the doctrine of
ownership;96 (6) the consideration of less than seven cents per acre and the
yearly rental of less than four cents per acre was inadequate, trifling, and
constituted the legal equivalent of paying no consideration;97 (7) State
Lease 318 was procured through conspiracy, favoritism, collusion, and
fraud;98 (8) State Lease 318 was invalid because then-Governor Allen
granted himself a 1/266th overriding royalty;99 and (9) State Lease 318
was one of several similar fraudulent transactions by W.T. Burton.100
Following six months of exceptions, amendments to the petition, and
other legal maneuverings, the court issued its reasons for judgment on
April 5, 1944. However, whether the court could determine the merits of
the State and the Mineral Board’s arguments depended on two
preliminary, procedural issues:
1. [Whether] the State of Louisiana in an action in which it may
have an interest as a distinct entity apart from other entities or
91. State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No. 22,664) (on file with the La. Dep’t
of Justice).
92. See Petition of State, ¶¶ 6–8, State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No.
22,664) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
93. Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
94. Id. ¶¶ 14–15.
95. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
96. Id. ¶ 19.
97. Id. ¶ 20.
98. Petition of State, ¶ 20, State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No. 22,664)
(on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
99. Id. ¶ 25.
100. Id. ¶ 27.
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corporate agencies it may create and in its own name and
sovereign capacity have the legal right or capacity under our law
to institute and maintain such action represented therein by and
through some person or agency of the State other than the
Attorney General as the legal representative of the State.
2. [Whether] the State of Louisiana as plaintiff in this suit have
any legal right or authority under our law to institute and maintain
this suit in the name of the State Mineral Board, or by any
supplemental pleadings implead or make the State Mineral Board
a co-plaintiff in the suit, even though it be alleged in such
supplemental and amended pleadings that the State Mineral Board
through its special counsel consents to being made a party plaintiff
with the State of Louisiana.101
In deciding these two preliminary issues, the court found in favor of
W.T. Burton and against both the State and the Louisiana Mineral Board.
It held that:
Since, therefore, this Court has already concluded that the State of
Louisiana as the plaintiff in the main or original suit is without
right or cause of action to institute this suit brought by and
represented therein by an individual or agency other than the
Attorney General and must be dismissed, it naturally follows that
this intervention, if it may be called such, must be dismissed,
without prejudice, however, to the right of the State Mineral Board
to asserts its rights in a separate action.102
Moreover, the court found that the State of Louisiana did not have the
authority to institute the suit by an individual or agency other than the
Attorney General and that the later joinder of the State Mineral Board as
an additional party plaintiff did not correct that error.103
The record reflects that the State parties filed an appeal after losing.
However, the appeal was jointly dismissed by the parties, stating that, “the
State Mineral Board has formally recognized the validity of [Lease 318]
and all of the differences existing between [the parties] concerning said
lease have been compromised and adjusted and the subject matter of said
litigation has, consequently, become moot.”104
101. Reasons for Judgment at 8–9, State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No.
22,664) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
102. Id. at 18–19.
103. Id. at 17–18.
104. Joint Motion for Dismissal of Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants, ¶ 2, State
v. Burton (La. 1944) (No. 37,524) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
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Ultimately, there was no ruling on the merits by a court as to the
validity of State Lease 318, the assignments of that lease to Win or Lose
Corporation, or any of the other substantive matters of interest to the
current review. Also, because this case was dismissed on procedural
grounds only, it does not have a res judicata binding effect on the State or
a taxpayer plaintiff as to the possible litigation of these matters today. 105
However, because the State Mineral Board and/or State “recognized the
validity of Lease 318,”106 it is reasonably likely that this apparent
ratification undermines the ability of the State to bring a challenge to this
lease today for leasing inconsistencies.107 In addition, the State’s
acceptance of the benefits of this lease subsequent to this settlement would
now, under State ex rel. Shell Oil Co., Inc. v. Register of State Land
Office,108 undermine the State’s ability to challenge the lease or the
settlement.
5. State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945) (No. 21,076)
In State v. Grace, filed on February 4, 1944, the State and the State
Mineral Board brought an action against the Register of State Lands,
Lucille May Grace, Independent Oil & Gas Corporation, Morris S.
Rhoads, John A. Farrell, and D.J. Simmons seeking a declaration that State
Lease 309 was invalid.109 State Lease 309 was granted to James A. Noe on
October 23, 1934, which was during the gubernatorial term of Oscar K.
Allen (and prior to Allen’s death).110 The basis of the original claim was
that, because no cash bonus was paid to the State for State Lease 309, the
real consideration for the lease was the lessee’s obligation to drill fifty
wells within the primary term.111 According to the Petition, after the
completion of only four wells, on August 21, 1935, the Register of the
State Land Office cancelled and changed the terms of the lease to require
105. See, e.g., Perrin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 248 So.2d 58, 60 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1971) (noting that a dismissal of a suit on procedural grounds alone
cannot be said to have a res judicata effect on the merits of the matter if brought
in a later suit).
106. Interestingly, A.J. Gray, III, has commented that the settlement of this suit
during the pendency of the appeal that was ultimately dismissed also resulted in a
“ratification of State Lease 340.” Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 29. However,
Mr. Gray did not provide any supporting documents for this assertion.
107. It should be noted that this lease no longer exists. The final release on
State Lease 318 occurred in 1975.
108. 192 So. 519 (La. 1939).
109. State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945) (No. 21,076) (on file with the La.
Dep’t of Justice).
110. See Petition of State, ¶¶ 5–6, State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945) (No.
21,076) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
111. Id. ¶ 11.
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only thirty wells, instead of fifty.112 The State alleged that such a change
constituted the Register acting beyond her authority to the prejudice of the
State.113
On July 6, 1944, the State amended its petition, alleging that State
Leases 494 and 495, which also covered areas within State Lease 309,
were invalid because they were issued pursuant to Acts 1940, No. 47,
which had been declared unconstitutional.114 Following this action, some
discovery was undertaken and answers were filed. In April of 1945, both
the State Mineral Board and the board of Independent Oil & Gas Co., Inc.
passed resolutions authorizing a settlement of this litigation.115
On May 2, 1945, the parties executed an agreement to settle and
compromise the lawsuit, with the private defendants paying the State the
sum of $10,000, as well as surrendering and releasing the property
described in State Lease 309.116 In exchange, the State agreed to ratify
State Lease 309, as amended by the Register on August 21, 1935, and to
dismiss its claims.117 On May 11, 1945, the court entered a judgment
dismissing the matter pursuant to the settlement among the parties.118
Accordingly, pursuant to this settlement and judgment: (1) State Lease 309
was recognized as a valid mineral lease between the State of Louisiana and
then Independent Oil & Gas Co., Farrell, Rhoads, and Simmons; (2) the
demands against Interstate Natural Gas Company and United Gas Public
Service Company were rejected and dismissed; and (3) the State received
a judgment in its favor in the amount of $10,000.119
The practical impact of this case is likely significant for the current
inquiry: this settlement and judgment most likely creates a situation where
the validity and viability of these leases, once called into question by the
State and the State Mineral Board, were settled and the judgment entered
by the court now has a res judicata effect on the State’s ability to challenge

112. Id. ¶ 14.
113. Id. ¶ 18.
114. Second Amended Petition of State, ¶ 2, State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C.
1945) (No. 21,076) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
115. The relevant resolutions accompany the suit’s settlement documents in
the public records of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources associated
with State Leases 494 and 495.
116. Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6(a)-(b), State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945)
(No. 21,076) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
117. Id. ¶ 6(d).
118. Judgment, at 1–2, State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945) (No. 21,076)
(rendered on May 11, 1945) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
119. Id. at 2.
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these leases.120 For this reason, the involvement of James A. Noe, Win or
Lose Corporation, or Independent Oil and Gas Company, Inc., as to State
Leases 309, 494, and 495 is considered no further. Pursuant to the
settlement and judgment, the State ratified the complained-of activities
and was compensated for its perceived losses.121 Effectively, the State has
been made whole with regard to these leases, regardless of a finding of
wrongdoing by the court.
6. Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338); 274 So.2d
205 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1973)
On July 27, 1971, Louis J. Roussel, Jr. filed a class action suit in St.
Mary Parish against two defendants: former Governor James A. Noe,
individually, and the State Mineral Board of the State of Louisiana.122
Roussel alleged that Noe conspired to utilize his position of trust to obtain
mineral interests in State properties, namely State Leases 340 and 341.123
According to Roussel, the conspiracy was confected through the creation
of the Win or Lose Corporation.124 Although by the time of Roussel’s suit
in the 1970s, the Win or Lose Corporation—which later changed its name
to Independent Oil & Gas Company, Inc.—had been liquidated, Roussel
alleged that many of the individual stockholders that gained an interest
upon liquidation benefitted from Noe’s actions in the awarding of certain
State leases and assignments.125 Roussel sought to have the leases declared
120. It is not possible to foreclose the ability of the State to raise today matters
somewhat related (though not the same) as the issues settled in this case. Such a
situation would be dependent upon the similarity of the claims today and the
claims in the 1944 litigation. The basic precepts underlying this qualification are
the requirements of the exception of res judicata. As Maraist and Lemmon have
noted, “res judicata is applicable to ‘all causes of action existing at the time of
final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the litigation.’” FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6:7, in 1
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed.). Thus, under LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art.
927(A)(3), in order for res judicata to apply to a matter, the claims must arise out
of the same “transaction or occurrence” that was the subject of the original case.
It is difficult to conceive of a scenario in which the State would be able to assert
claims not originally raised or able to be raised in the original suit, thus making a
viable cause of action as to these leases after the 1944 litigation unlikely.
121. A very rough calculation of the inflationary value of this $10,000.00
figure from 1945 in 2016 dollars is $134,126.67. CPI Inflation Calculator,
BUREAU LAB. STAT., data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
122. See Petition of Louis J. Roussel, ¶ 55, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C.
1980) (No. 42,338) (original petition filed on July 27, 1971) (on file with the La.
Dep’t of Justice). The putative class members were all Louisiana taxpayers.
123. Id. ¶¶ 11, 24–25.
124. Id. ¶¶ 32, 46.
125. Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
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null and void, and to require an accounting and reimbursement to the
State.126
Roussel brought his action based upon his alleged standing as a
Louisiana taxpayer.127 On August 26, 1971, the district court ruled that
Roussel, as a taxpayer, had no standing to bring such an action, and that
the Attorney General was the only party empowered to bring such a suit.128
The court further ruled that, because Roussel’s suit would necessarily
impact the rights of those that had acquired interests in the subject leases
by way of assignment, all of the assignees of the challenged leases were
necessary parties to the litigation.129 These rulings led to a dismissal of
Roussel’s suit by the district court on August 31, 1971.130
Following the district court’s dismissal of Roussel’s suit on
exceptions, Roussel appealed to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal. On review, in Roussel v. Noe, the first circuit affirmed the district
court’s rejection of the class action nature of Roussel’s suit.131 However,
the court did find that Roussel was “entitled to proceed as an individual
taxpayer.”132 The court further stated that, “the Attorney General may
intervene [in Roussel’s suit] if he so desires and assert . . . whatever
position his judgment dictates is the proper one for the State of
Louisiana.”133 This judgment effectively revived Roussel’s suit.
The first circuit went on to declare that the State Mineral Board had
been improperly joined in the suit against Noe.134 The reason for this ruling
was that the action against the State Mineral Board was a mandamus action
seeking the cancellation of the challenged leases. Such a summary
proceeding cannot be cumulated with an ordinary proceeding; thus, the
two causes of action against Noe could not survive together as one suit.
Noting that “[m]andamus does not lie to compel the performance of a
discretionary act[,]”135 the first circuit effectively severed the State
Mineral Board as a defendant (and upheld its dismissal in the district court)
in the continued prosecution of Roussel’s case. It stated that “[t]he State
Mineral Board cannot be said to have failed to perform its ministerial duty
126. Id. ¶ 55.
127. Id. ¶ 1–2.
128. See Reasons for Rulings on Exceptions, at 1–2, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th
J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338) (filed on Aug. 27, 1971) (on file with the La. Dep’t of
Justice).
129. Id. at 3.
130. See Judgment, at 1, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338)
(signed on Aug. 31, 1971) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
131. 274 So.2d 205 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1973).
132. Id. at 209.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 212–13.
135. Id. at 213.
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until such time as plaintiff has successfully invalidated Noe’s and others’
interests in and to the royalties emanating from the subject leases.”136 Yet,
Roussel had not proven that any of the challenged leases had been
improperly granted. Thus, no mandatory duty on the part of the State
Mineral Board to cancel the leases could exist to which a mandamus action
could attach. Further, even if such a duty was later found, such an action
could not be brought as part of an ordinary proceeding, as mandamus
actions employ a separate procedure.137 Thus, any such demand would
have to be brought later in a separate lawsuit.
Finally, the first circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that parties
holding interests in the leases by way of assignment must be joined as
parties to the lawsuit.138 Thus, in order to continue this action, Roussel was
required to add as defendant parties numerous other interest holders in the
leases.
On remand, Roussel continued the prosecution of his case. To begin,
Roussel amended his petition to join multiple defendants that claimed an
interest in State Leases 340 and 341.139 Among the newly named
defendants was the State of Louisiana, represented by the State Mineral
Board.140 Roussel again amended his petition on April 29, 1974, to add
additional defendants with interests in the subject leases.141
Once again, the State and the State Mineral Board were dismissed
from the litigation on exceptions of no right of action.142 Although The
Texas Company was also dismissed under a no cause exception,143 the
remaining defendants were not dismissed, thus allowing the suit to
continue.144

136. Id.
137. FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.3, in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (2d ed.).
138. Roussel v. Noe, 274 So.2d 205, 211 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1973).
139. Amended Petition of Louis J. Roussel, ¶ 8, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C.
1980) (No. 42,338) (filed on Sept. 18, 1973) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
140. Id.
141. See Supplemental and Amending Petition of Louis J. Roussel, ¶ 8,
Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338) (filed on Apr. 29, 1974) (on
file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
142. Reasons for Judgment, at 5–6, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No.
42,338) (rendered on May 11, 1977) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
143. Id. at 4.
144. See Judgment on Dilatory Exceptions of Vagueness, Roussel v. Noe (La.
16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42, 338) (rendered on August 2, 1977) (on file with the
La. Dep’t of Justice); Judgement on Dilatory Exceptions of Lack of Procedural
Capacity, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42, 338) (rendered on
August 2, 1977) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
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The next significant activity came on November 21, 1979, when the
remaining defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting the
following:
A) The state mineral leases involved in this case were issued in
accordance with the law in effect at the time and neither fraud nor
conspiracy was involved.145
B) During the relevant period of time, there was no prohibition
against defendants or their respective ancestors in the title
acquiring an interest in mineral leases.146
C)The release and compromise agreements between the State
Mineral Board, The Texas Company, Mr. Burton, and Win or
Lose Corporation (Independent Oil and Gas Company, Inc.) in
1943 bar prosecution of this suit by Plaintiff as representative of
the State of Louisiana.147
D) Prosecution of this suit is barred by the well recognized and
judicially accepted principle [of] doctrine of estoppel.148
Inexplicably at the time, Roussel did not respond to the remaining
defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the court issued
Reasons for Judgment on May 7, 1980, noting that the plaintiff’s failure
to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment required a dismissal of
the suit, and a Judgment was entered to that effect on June 16, 1980.149
Because of Roussel’s failure to respond to the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed in 1979, there was no consideration of the merits of his
claims. This oddity was definitively answered when Roussel published his
memoirs in 1997.150 In his book, Roussel stated that he did not respond to
the Motion for Summary Judgment and that he otherwise let the case
against State Leases 340 and 341 lapse because of his friendships with

145. Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, at 46,
Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338) (filed on Nov. 21, 1979) (on
file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
146. Id. at 51.
147. Id. at 54.
148. Id. at 60.
149. Reasons for Judgment, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42, 338)
(filed on May 7, 1980) (on file with author); Order and Judgment, Roussel v. Noe (La.
16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42, 338) (filed June 16, 1980) (on file with author).
150. See generally LOUIS J. ROUSSEL, JR., FRIENDS, ENEMIES & VICTIMS: THE
PERSONAL SUCCESS OF A SEVENTH-GRADER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LOUIS J.
ROUSSEL, JR. (Sheree Kerner ed., 1997).
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Earle Christenberry and Seymour Weiss.151 Thus, Roussel’s personal
decision explains why there is no substantive ruling on his allegations.152
An interesting effect of the Roussel suit was that then-Attorney
General William Guste filed a substantive brief summarizing the history
of the Win or Lose Corporation investigations by the Office of the
Attorney General.153 This brief assessed the chances of the success of such
a suit on the merits, looking at the customs of the time and at the available
evidence. In this regard, Guste stated that, “this investigation, to date, has
produced no legally admissible evidence of fraud.”154 Further, Guste
provided that:
At the time of the execution of mineral leases 340 and 341, by the
defendant, then Governor, there was no statute prohibiting him
from owning stock in a corporation securing oil or gas rights under
a State lease granted to another by him. Nor was there a statute
which prohibited the governor or any public official from directly
bidding for, and as high bidder, securing State mineral leases.155
Thus, when this issue was before the courts in the 1970s—more than
thirty years closer in time to the events that are the subject of this article—
the Attorney General could find neither a factual nor a legal basis to
support Roussel’s allegations.
Although the Attorney General participated in this matter, his
involvement as an amicus, in addition to the State’s peripheral
involvement in the case as a party defendant, does not preclude the State
from bringing an action on these same questions today. However, the
above accounts, which are statements of record from the State’s chief legal
officer at the time, would likely constitute substantial statements against

151. Id. at 89.
152. This point is important to note, as, in his autobiography, Roussel notes that
“[t]he suit, accusing the six of cheating the state out of $250 million was valid and was
sent to a state court for trial.” Id. With this statement, Roussel implies that the first
circuit had substantively ruled on his allegations. It did not. As discussed, the first
circuit merely ruled on exceptions and allowed the merits of the case to go forward.
There was no substantive decision in this case. The “six” that Roussel referred to in
the above quote are: Huey P. Long, Oscar K. Allen, James A. Noe, Earle J.
Christenberry, Seymour Weiss, and Alice L. Grosjean. Id. at 87.
153. Brief for State of Louisiana as Amici Curiae, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th
J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338), (Nov. 15, 1973) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
154. Brief for State of Louisiana as Amici Curiae at 8, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th
J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338), (Nov. 15, 1973) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
155. Id. at ¶ XXIX.
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interest should an action be brought.156 Such statements against interest
would create a substantial evidentiary difficulty for the State in any
present-day litigation. Importantly, as has been noted by Gray, this case
represented the first and last time that all living parties to the allegedly
corrupt mineral leases were available.157 Many of these individuals were
interviewed or deposed by the parties to the litigation without any
“smoking gun” to the allegations that have lingered around these leases
for so long being identified.158 Interestingly, should private parties
ultimately find merit in Roussel’s claims and be able to remedy what most
parties in the 1970s recognized as a substantial lack of evidence, Roussel’s
case certainly stands for the proposition that a private party may maintain
such an action.
7. Summary of the Win or Lose Cases
Although these cases are useful for providing a historical background
to the Win or Lose matter, they resulted in little, if any, substantive
examination of the actual allegations that Huey P. Long or his colleagues
swindled the State through the Win or Lose Corporation’s actions. The
Roussel case came the closest to substantively addressing these issues.
However, because that case never advanced past the procedural stages,
there was no definitive outcome. As can be seen throughout this article,
the U.S. v. Noe matter, though largely unrelated to the Win or Lose issues
(i.e., it was a tax evasion case) sheds, through the trial transcript,
considerable light on the history and motives of the individuals involved
in the Win or Lose matter. With these two exceptions noted, the previous
litigation related to the Win or Lose leases is largely uninstructive with
respect to the issues currently raised. Further, these cases would likely not
156. With regard to a statement against interest, we here refer to that evidentiary
exception to the hearsay rule which Maraist, et al., has described thusly:
Under the Louisiana rule, the statement at the time it was made must have
been ‘so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or
so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid
a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.’
FRANK L. MARAIST, EVIDENCE AND PROOF § 10.8, in 19 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (2d ed.).
157. Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 39. By way of reference, Gray lists the
following individuals who were interviewed in some form or fashion during the
course of the Roussel litigation: W.T. Burton; Carl Campbell (former State Land
Office employee); Earle J. Christenberry; Dudley G. Couvillon (former SMB
Secretary); William A. Romans (former SMB employee); Alice Lee Grosjean Tharpe;
George A. Wilson (former Department of Minerals attorney); C.C. Wood (former
Special Assistant to Attorney General Eugene Stanley). Id. at 39–45.
158. Id. at 39.
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control any potential action that the State or a private party may attempt to
institute against the current Win or Lose interests. Due to the lack of
guidance from these cases, the current analysis herein reviews all of the
issues anew.
B. Historic Attorney General Reviews of the Win or Lose Leases
In addition to the various lawsuits involving Win or Lose, the
Louisiana Attorney General’s Office has also examined, on several
occasions, the legality and propriety of the corporation’s leases. Many of
these reviews were to fulfill the campaign promises made by Attorney
General Eugene Stanley, who vowed to investigate alleged wrongdoing
associated with the letting of State mineral leases.159 The news coverage
of the time reveals difficult relationships between Attorney General
Stanley, the State Mineral Board, and Governor Sam Jones. The tension
largely centered on whether sufficient evidence existed to bring any actual
litigation against the Win or Lose State leases.160 A brief review of the
results of those examinations is contained herein.161
1. The 1936 Gardiner Letter
On February 27, 1936, Special Assistant to the Attorney General
Lessley P. Gardiner issued a letter detailing the results of an inquiry into
the validity of State Lease 327, one of the Win or Lose leases.162 Citing
Acts 1915, No. 30 (as amended, Acts 1926, No. 315), Gardiner provided
that the Governor was vested with the authority to execute State mineral
159. Stanley Declares Issue is Freedom Versus Slavery, MORNING
ADVOCATE, Jan. 14, 1938.
160. Action on Oil Lease Frauds in Louisiana Urged by Gov. Jones,
SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 9, 1943, at 10; B. L. Krebs, Jones Asks Action on Oil
Leases Let by Long Regime, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 9, 1943, at 1; Mineral Board
to Hire Special Counsel if Stanley Doesn’t Act, SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 12,
1943, at 2; Mineral Board to Quiz Stanley at Meeting Today, SHREVEPORT TIMES,
May 20, 1943, at 6; THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, State Body Asks Special Counsel:
Seeks Aid on Oil Leases; Stanley Sees No Fraud, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 21,
1943, at 1.
161. This particular review excludes the Attorney General’s participation as
an amicus curiae in the Roussel v. Noe matter. On September 15, 1973, Attorney
General William J. Guste, in his amicus brief, noted that the Attorney General’s
investigation of this matter produced no legally admissible evidence of fraud.
Aside from that mention, there is no substantive analysis of the facts that is worthy
of review here and that document is thus excluded from this review.
162. Letter from Lessley P. Gardiner, Special Assistant Att’y Gen., to the
McGinley Corporation (Feb. 27, 1936) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). The
letter appears to have originated as an informal Attorney General’s Opinion
request from a private party, which was answered formally through this letter.
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leases to the highest bidder “under such terms and conditions as to him
seem proper.”163 Gardiner also noted that, as to State Lease 327: all
formalities were complied with; the bid from W.T. Burton was the only
one received for this lease; and the lease was duly executed in his favor.164
Gardiner’s assessment of the applicable law is accurate and, at the time,
the Governor held plenary authority to grant State mineral leases.165 A
review of the public records related to State Lease 327 also indicates that
Gardiner’s statements about the bid process were accurate.
2. The 1941 Gensler Memorandum
On April 16, 1941, Philip Gensler, a Special Assistant Attorney
General, authored a memorandum analyzing State Lease 335.166 Although
this memorandum does not so state, it appears to be a preliminary
assessment or a status report of ongoing inquiries. With respect to this lease,
Gensler concluded that, should a proper investigation be made, The Texas
Company would be shown to have known or condoned allegedly
inappropriate actions of various officials involved in the granting of State
Lease 335.167 Therefore, it was not an innocent third party purchaser of its
rights in the lease.168 However, due to a lack of evidence, Gensler stopped
short of concluding that actual fraud was involved in the granting of State
Lease 335. Gensler also noted that, should a suit to cancel these leases be
instituted, the suit would have to be filed against W.T. Burton, Delta
Development Company, the Land Investment Company, The Texas
Company, and the Win or Lose Oil Corporation—by then, the Independent
Oil and Gas Company, Inc.169 With the foregoing in mind, Gensler noted
that further investigation of his preliminary findings should be made.170
Additionally, if evidence proving fraud could not be obtained, then the
continued viability of State Lease 335 should be examined from the
perspective of reasonable development of the lease as required by the law.171
Gensler essentially deferred the questions of illegality to the Crime
Commission and made no legally binding conclusions. Certainly, his
163. Id. at 1.
164. Id.
165. See William O. Bonin, Public Mineral Leasing in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L.
REV. 246, 246–47 (1953).
166. Memorandum from Philip Gensler, Special Assistant Att’y Gen. (Apr.
16, 1941) (describing the result of an investigation of State Lease No. 335) (on
file with the La. Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Gensler Memorandum].
167. Id. at 10–11.
168. Id. at 11.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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observation that The Texas Company may not have acquired its interest in
State Lease 335 is intriguing and would undermine a claim that The Texas
Company—later Texaco—held its interests in this lease in good faith.172
However, Gensler provides no evidence to support this allegation. In fact,
he even admits that, absent such evidence, there is no basis for attacking
the legality of the lease based upon this analysis.173
3. The 1941 Perrault Memorandum and Analysis
Shortly after the release of Gensler’s memorandum, Second Assistant
Attorney General W.C. Perrault issued a memorandum to Attorney
General Eugene Stanley on July 15, 1941, detailing many of Gensler’s
arguments.174 As an initial matter, Perrault stated that, “[a] number of
suspicious circumstances attended the execution of the . . . leases.”175 The
State Leases examined by Perrault were State Leases 309, 318, 323, 334,
335, 340, 341, and 344.176 Perrault provided that the original lessee made
large profits by the assignment of some of the leases involved in this
inquiry.177 Nonetheless, such a scenario does not, in and of itself, make the
lease transactions illegal.
However, Perrault did identify specific problems with the subject
leases. There were some instances where “bids accepted by the State were
typewritten and the amount of the bid filled in in blank places on the

172. The absence of evidence to support an allegation of bad faith becomes
important, as discussed at length below, when considering what rights Texaco and
its subsequent iterations have in such leases today. It should be noted that the
Texaco Global Settlement Agreement in 1994 likely undermines pursuing any
litigation theory related to Texaco’s bad faith as to any of the leases covered by
that agreement from 1994 to the present. See discussion infra Part V.C.
173. Gensler Memorandum, supra note 166, at 11.
174. Memorandum from W.C. Perrault, Second Assistant Att’y Gen., to
Eugene Stanley, La. Att’y Gen. (July 15, 1941) (regarding State Mineral Leases
Nos. 309, 318, 323, 334, 335, 340, 341, and 344) (on file with the La. Dep’t of
Justice) [hereinafter Perrault Memorandum].
175. Id. at 1.
176. Id.
177. Id. It is important to note that, although this information is interesting,
there is nothing unlawful about a State lessee obtaining a lease and then selling,
whether immediately or at some point after the awarding of the lease, rights in the
lease to third parties at a profit. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:128 (stating that
any transfer or assignment of state owned mineral rights requires State Mineral
and Energy Board approval; noting that the statute contains no restrictions as to
profit making on such assignments).
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typewritten copy on the day of the acceptance . . . .”178 In other instances,
Perrault states that, “it was questionable if the [State] accepted the best bid
. . . .”179 Perrault also identified other instances “where the best bid was
unquestionably not accepted but a lower bid actually accepted . . . .”180 In
addition, Perrault cites instances where an executed lease “carried no cash
consideration as required by the advertisement . . . .”181 and where “only a
nominal cash consideration was paid for the lease . . . .”182 Finally, Perrault
states that, “in all of the leases the Win-or-Lose Oil Company, composed
principally of officials of the former government, winds up with an
interest.”183
178. Perrault Memorandum, supra note 174, at 1. For this problem, Perrault
references State Leases 318, 334, 335, 340, 341, and 344. Id. A reexamination of
the bid forms for these leases confirms that the amounts on these bid forms were,
indeed, hand written into typed forms. However, unlike Perrault’s conclusion that
the, “blank places [were filled in] on the day of the acceptance,” our review of
these documents demonstrates that there is no indication as to when these amounts
were written into the forms. Thus, we cannot now conclude that this issue
identified by Perrault amounts to a problem that would constitute a legal error for
the subject leases.
179. Id. In this regard, Perrault references State Lease 323. Id. A review of the
available public records related to this lease does not show any connection to Win
or Lose Corporation aside from the fact that the lease was granted by Governor
Noe. In addition, this lease is no longer viable. It was released on July 22, 1953.
Accordingly, this lease is not considered further.
180. Id. Concerning this situation, Perrault references State Lease 335. Id. A
review of the public records for this lease reflects that only one bid was
submitted—that of W.T. Burton. No higher or lower bids for this lease exist.
181. Id. An example of this scenario is cited as State Lease 309. Id. Perrault is
correct that there was no cash bonus paid for State Lease 309. There does not
appear to be any explanation for this absence. It is important to note, however,
that none of the law related to mineral leasing at the time required such
consideration. Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 62, as amended by Act No. 315,
1926 La. Acts 606-07. However, the same law did provide the Governor with
plenary authority to accept or reject any bids in his discretion. Id. It is thus
probable that, as there was no legal requirement for the consideration, and because
the Governor had plenary authority to accept or reject bids, he was authorized to
waive this requirement if it was not met. This notion is supported by a letter to
Governor Allen by Attorney General Porterie in which the Attorney General
stresses the plenary authority of the Governor in the granting of mineral leases
under the terms and conditions that the Governor, in his discretion, sees fit. Letter
from Gaston L. Porterie, La. Att’y Gen., to Oscar K. Allen, La. Governor (Jan.
23, 1936) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). Further, testimony elicited during
the United States v. Noe trial, discussed supra, indicates that the consideration
provided for State Lease 309 was the agreement to drill fifty wells rather than
paying a cash bonus. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 62–
63 (citing testimony of Leonard M. Levy).
182. Perrault Memorandum, supra note 174, at 1. State Lease 323 is cited for
this problem. Id.
183. Id.
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Despite the identified problems with these leases, Perrault ultimately
concluded that, due to a lack of proof of fraud, the insinuation of fraud
from the circumstances was legally insufficient to proceed with judicial
action aimed at cancelling these leases.184 In that regard, Perrault states:
Despite the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution
of these leases, as above pointed out, I am not prepared to say that
fraud entered into these transactions. Investigation thus far made
has unearthed none, and no further evidence can be secured except
from those who may have participated in the fraud, if any fraud
existed. I think, therefore, that these leases cannot successfully be
attacked for fraud because of lack of proof. Mere suspicion or
probability of its existence are insufficient under the law.185
This statement appears to be the most significant indictment of the
conspiracy theories surrounding the Win or Lose leases existing since its
inception in the 1930s. There is no reasonable basis on which to doubt or
deny Perrault’s assessment of the evidentiary problems for making a case
for fraud. Bound by the laws on fraud in place at the time, any new suit to
prove what Perrault did not believe could be proven in 1941 likely would
be impossible today. As Perrault correctly states, mere insinuation and
184. Id.
185. Id. At the end of this statement, Perrault cites to “9 La. Dig., Section 50,
Page 95, citing numerous cases.” Although the page numbers differ today, the
general citation, “9 La. Dig., Section 50,” remains the same as it was in 1941. It
is from the Louisiana Digest, and it deals with the presumptions and burdens of
proof for fraud. Rather than simply citing to this section of the Louisiana Digest,
it seems more appropriate to actually cite some of the cases that Perrault would
have seen in the Digest in 1941. In Angichiodo v. Cerami, 35 F. Supp. 359, 369
(W.D. La. 1940), a Louisiana federal court noted that, “[f]raud is never imputed
except on legal and convincing evidence produced by the one alleging it.” In
addition, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Rachal,
166 So. 129, 130 (La. 1936), noted that, “[f]raud is never presumed, and the
burden rests upon the person alleging fraud to prove it.” See also Garnier v. Aetna
Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 159 So. 705 (La. 1935); Strauss v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
102 So. 861 (La. 1925); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 57 So. 935 (La. 1912); Breaux v.
Broussard, 40 So. 639 (La. 1906). In addition to these cases, in 1941, there were
an additional twelve appellate court cases in the Louisiana Digest in which the
various courts espoused the same principle. The purpose of this examination of
Perrault’s citation is to note that Perrault’s conclusion that fraud is difficult to
prove and cannot be based upon supposition was soundly based upon the
Louisiana jurisprudence at the time. The same basic standard of proof for fraud
applies today. See, e.g., Hall v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 368 So.2d 984, 993
(La. 1978), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 452 U.S. 571
(1981) (“It is well settled that one who alleges fraud has the burden of establishing
it by legal and convincing evidence since fraud is never presumed, and that to
establish fraud exceptionally strong proof must be adduced.”).
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innuendo that something is amiss with the subject leases does not create a
colorable basis upon which to bring a fraud suit. The missing component
to bringing such a suit is, as Perrault notes, evidence from those involved
in the fraud. In 1941, many of the key individuals noted in Part II of this
article were alive and able to interview. Thus, in 1941, with the exceptions
of Huey P. Long and Oscar K. Allen, the Louisiana Attorney General’s
Office could have probed further into the fraud allegations by collecting
information from living informants. Today, the necessary individuals to
take a mere allegation to a colorable legal claim are deceased—the missing
evidence is forever lost. This latter statement is tempered by the existence
of some available testimony from the 1942 U.S. v. Noe matter and some
depositions that were taken in the 1970s for the Roussel v. Noe matter. Yet,
as was shown in the reviews of these cases above, even questioning by
federal prosecutors in the U.S. v. Noe trial and by private attorneys in
preparation for the Roussel v. Noe case elicited no evidence of fraud
related to the State’s leasing to W.T. Burton or the Win or Lose
Corporation.186
In defense of the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office in 1941, a later
letter by Special Assistant Attorney General Philip Gensler suggests that
the primary reason for no subsequent investigation of those alive with
knowledge of the acquisition of the subject leases appears to have been
due to lack of support.187 In this regard, Gensler stated that, “[d]ue to the
limited personnel of our office and lack of appropriation, the Louisiana
Attorney General’s Office has not been offered the opportunity of making
thorough investigation of these leases . . . .”188 This statement illustrates a
recurring theme—that any investigation of this matter takes time and
money—that resonates throughout the history of the Win or Lose
matter.189
Further, Perrault noted that as early as 1941, most of the subject
mineral leases were held by third parties, making their cancellation even
more difficult.190 With respect to this problem, Perrault stated:

186. See generally discussion supra part II.A.3.
187. Letter from Philip Gensler, Special Assistant Att’y Gen., to State Mineral
Board (Oct. 31, 1941) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Gensler
Letter].
188. Id. at 2.
189. See, e.g., La. H.R. 88 (2012) (proposing that the Louisiana Attorney
General’s Office investigate mineral lease contracts with the Win or Lose
Corporation, which was ultimately defeated in the House Judiciary Committee on
May 17, 2012).
190. Perrault Memorandum, supra note 174, at 1.
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All of the leases are presently owned by third persons who,
presumably at least, dealt on the faith of the public records in
acquiring them, and they cannot be set aside to the prejudice of
these persons unless it be shown by competent evidence that they
had prior knowledge of any fraud practiced upon the State by the
original lessees. We have no such proof.191
Therefore, the same problem, with an additional seventy-plus years of
assignments and other transfers of the subject leases, is a remaining
obstacle to any State action today.
4. The 1937 Wood Memorandum
On July 6, 1937, C.C. Wood, of the Office of the Attorney General,
issued a memorandum analyzing potential problems with State Lease
318.192 In this memorandum, Wood notes that there is no term identified
in State Lease 318.193 However, he also stated that, while this is an odd
omission from the lease, there are other provisions of the lease that trigger
payments from the lessor, W.T. Burton, in order to maintain the lease in
the event that no production is underway.194 Interestingly, Wood provided
that, “[a]ccording to the information that we have, a conspiracy was
confected between Burton and James A. Noe whereby Burton was to
secure the lease . . . [and] assign the lease to The Texas Company . . . .”195
Further, Wood discussed how the private interests in this lease were to be
divided among Burton, The Texas Company, and Win or Lose.196
Although Wood specifically referred to “information that we have,”197 he
did not elaborate on what this information was. Research on this matter
has failed to identify any information in support of this conspiracy claim.
Wood also alluded to the possibility that the information that he refers to
came by word-of-mouth from someone who witnessed Burton’s grand
jury testimony.198 However, there is nothing concrete in Wood’s
memorandum on this point and efforts to locate information related to the
grand jury have been unsuccessful.

191. Id. at 1.
192. Memorandum from C.C. Wood, Special Assistant Att’y Gen. (July 6,
1937) (describing the results of an investigation of State Lease No. 318) (on file
with the La. Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Wood Memorandum].
193. Id. at 1.
194. Id. at 1–2.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Wood Memorandum, supra note 192, at 4.
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Additionally, Wood identified some of the proof problems inherent in
the conspiracy allegation. For instance, he referenced Burton’s grand jury
testimony. Burton allegedly stated that Governor Allen, although a
participant in the lease later through Win or Lose, did not know of the
connection that he would later have to the lease that he originally granted
to Burton.199 Wood believed that this lack of a connection to Allen was
defeating of a viable conspiracy claim.200 In this regard, he stated that: “[i]f
we could show that Allen was also a member of this conspiracy, we feel
certain that this lease could be set aside as having been obtained by
fraudulent means, but unless we can show that, the possibility of success
along this course is remote.”201 Presumably, the primary reason that such
involvement could not be proven was due to Allen’s untimely death; any
testimony regarding his involvement would likely be subject to hearsay
exceptions.
Wood also provided, if it could be proven that The Texas Company
had participated in the actual acquisition of State Lease 318 rather than
merely being a third party acquirer of an interest from Burton, then the
lease may be voidable.202 However, aside from suggesting that The Texas
Company may have been induced not to bid on the lease in order to keep
the actual lease price artificially low, Wood offererd no other explanation
of The Texas Company’s involvement in the letting of State Lease 318.
Specifically, Wood did not refer to any evidence, nor has any such
evidence since been identified to support this theory.203
Wood’s memorandum also included several other theories for
invalidating State Lease 318, including, but not limited to, cancelling the
lease for the lessee’s failure to timely pay rentals.204 Although State Lease
318 was the subject of the State v. Burton suit,205 that suit was dismissed
upon a settlement to which the State was a party.206 Thus, even if Wood’s
theories for cancelling the lease were correct, the 1943 settlement over the
lease effectively estops the State from now complaining of the results of
that settlement, which included the continued existence of the lease.
However, Wood did not know this at the time, as the settlement occurred
six years after he authored his memorandum.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wood Memorandum, supra note 192, at 5–7.
(La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No. 22, 664) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
See Joint Motion for Dismissal, supra note 104.
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Nonetheless, State Lease 318 no longer exists; it was released in
portions, concluding with a final release in 1975.207 Since the lease was
allowed to continue after the settlement of the State v. Burton litigation,
and the State obtained benefits from its continuance until its release in
1975, there is nothing to cancel. Therefore, it is inadvisable to seek
rescission of the rights that flowed from the lease when it was extant, if
such is even a possibility.
5. The 1941 Gay Memorandum
On October 8, 1941, Edward J. Gay, Jr., with the Louisiana Attorney
General’s Office, produced a memorandum analyzing the legality and
validity of State Lease 340.208 In this review, Gay noted that the lease,
which was granted to W.T Burton by Governor James A. Noe on February
7, 1936, did not include an overriding royalty.209 According to Gay, the
overriding royalty of up to $500,000 from a 1/128th share of production
was added by way of a rider after the submission of the original bid.210
However, it is unclear upon what Gay based this conclusion regarding the
later addition of a rider—a document that, today, is often made a part of
an original lease document. Gay properly noted that Burton’s overriding
royalty offer to the State was above and beyond the mandatory 12.5%
royalty.211 When it was submitted, it was substantially less than that of
other bidders, particularly the bid of Gulf Company, which included an
207. Affidavit of Lease Cancellation, State Lease 318 (on file with the La. Dep’t
of Justice).
208. Memorandum from Edward J. Gay, Jr., Office of the Att’y Gen. (Oct. 8,
1941) (describing the results of an investigation of State Lease No. 340) (on file
with the La. Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Gay Memorandum].
209. Id. at 5. The term “overriding royalty,” which differs from royalties that
are typically received by a landowner as the grantor of a mineral lease, is defined
as:
[A]n interest carved out of the lessee’s working interest. It entitles its
owner to a fraction of production free of any production or operating
expense, but not free of production or severance tax levied on
production. An overriding royalty may be created by a grant or by
reservation. Commonly, an override is reserved by the assignor in a
farmout agreement or other assignment. An override’s duration
corresponds to that of the lease from which it was created.
UNIV. OF TEX., supra note 54, at 191. See also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
54, at 410. It is important to note, because of the reality that many of the Win or
Lose leases are subject to overrides in favor of various right holders, that such an
activity was not and is not uncommon in Louisiana (or elsewhere). See John M.
McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under the New Louisiana
Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 732, 828 (1976).
210. Gay Memorandum, supra note 208, at 2, 5.
211. Id. at 5.
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overriding royalty of $1,250,000.00.212 However, none of the other bidders
on State Lease 340 offered a bonus or a rental to the State that was as large
as that offered by Burton.213 Because of the differences between the
overriding royalty offers and the bonus and rental submitted by the bidders
for State Lease 340, Gay did not, and likely could not, make a
determination as to whether the lease to Burton constituted the lease that
was most advantageous to the State. However, he did note that, “[t]he main
point to be considered, therefore, is whether or not the lease was granted
to the person submitting the most advantageous bid as required by law.”214
There is no indication from this memorandum whether the “most
advantageous” analysis was ever undertaken. Gay certainly does not make
any determination or declaration that the Burton bid or the subsequent
lease was invalid, but merely notes the possible irregularities of the late
and low overriding royalty. Ultimately, Gay never answers whether this
bid was most advantageous to the State considering the higher and timely
bonus and rental of Gulf Company.215
6. The 1941 Gensler Letter
Philip Gensler’s letter is addressed to the State Mineral Board and
appears to summarize the findings reported in the previously discussed
1941 Perrault Memorandum to Attorney General Stanley.216
For an unstated reason, Gensler’s October 31, 1941 letter to the Board
refers to more State leases being reviewed than those covered by the Perrault
Memorandum.217 A review of the public records clearly indicates that W.T.
Burton’s involvement in the leasing was not the reason for the review of
these additional leases. Although he was the lessee of State Lease 42, he was
not the lessee on any of the additional leases that were not considered in the
Perrault Memorandum.218 A letter by Special Assistant Attorney General
Edward L. Gladney, Jr., to Major B.A. Hardey, Chairman of the State
Mineral Board provides a probable answer to why these additional leases
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Gensler Letter, supra note 187.
217. Compare id. at 1, with Perrault Memorandum, supra note 174, at 1. The
additional leases not covered in the Perrault Memorandum include: State Lease
Nos. 42, 50, 164, 194, 199, 301, 331, 347, and 356.
218. In addition to the Burton leases noted, infra, W.T. Burton was also the
State’s lessee on the following State Leases granted prior to 1941 (the date of the
Gensler Letter and the Perrault Memorandum): 321, 322, 326, 327, 330, 332, 336,
and 337. None of these leases were assigned to the Win or Lose Corporation or
any of its officers.
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were reviewed by the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office.219 In the letter,
Gladney references “sixteen leases which the Attorney General was
requested ‘to take action immediately to recover for the State of Louisiana
all profits or overriding royalties fraudulently or illegally obtained in
connection with any mineral lease covering State owned property . . . .’”220
Apparently, these additional leases were part of a broader request from the
State Mineral Board for the Attorney General to review a collection of leases
for possible illegalities or underdevelopment.221 Thus, Gensler’s 1941 letter
to the State Mineral Board would constitute an interim report on each of
these reviews.
However, Gensler stated that thus far, no evidence of fraud had been
found.222 Gensler stated, “[i]n practically all of these instances, the State
has received rentals and royalties from said leases.”223 This point cannot
be overstated. Pursuant to Acts 1915, No. 30, as amended by Acts 1926,
No. 315, the State could not lease its property for oil and gas production
for less than a one-eighth royalty reserved to the State.224 The royalty rates
at which the State would be paid for each of the leases noted in the Perrault
Memorandum were all one-eighth—precisely consistent with what the law
required.225 In other words, the State received all of the royalties that it was
due as provided by law, regardless of whether and to whom the leases were
awarded or assigned.
Based upon the preliminary results reported in this letter, Gensler
concluded that the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office is “ . . . not prepared
to prove fraud by legally admissible evidence with reference to the above
referred to suspicious circumstances.”226 In addition to this assessment,
Gensler goes on to note that: “[m]ost of these leases are held by third parties
at the present time and, in order to cancel same as of their inception, fraud
would have to be shown in the present holders, or that they did not acquire

219. See Letter from Edward L. Gladney, Jr., Special Assistant Att’y Gen., to
Major B.A. Hardey, Chairman, State Mineral Board (Apr. 29, 1943) (on file with
the La. Dep’t of Justice).
220. Id. at 1.
221. The broader inquiry by the Attorney General is discussed in an article in
THE TIMES-PICAYUNE newspaper in 1940. In this article, Attorney General
Stanley details his intent to investigate numerous pre-State Mineral Board leases
for unlawful activity and failure to develop the leases. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Stanley Plans Suits for Hundred Million in State Oil Leases, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Aug. 15, 1940, at 1.
222. Gensler Letter, supra note 187, at 2.
223. Id.
224. See Act No. 30, 1915 La. Acts 62, as amended by Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts
606.
225. See Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606-07.
226. Gensler Letter, supra note 187, at 2.
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in good faith on the face of the public records.”227 Particularly, if there had
been any fraud in the acquisition of the subject leases from the State, the
parties with an interest in the leases as of the date of the letter that relied
on the public records, as Louisiana law encourages and permits,228 would
have “clean hands.” Therefore, it could not be stripped of their rights under
these leases that were acquired in good faith.
The letter goes on to discuss matters related to whether these leases
had been properly developed as of the date of the letter. Gensler admitted
that the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office is not equipped to make such
assessments and thus, recommended that more information be supplied to
the State Mineral Board by the State Geologist, the State Board of
Engineers, and the Conservation Department to answer this question.229
7. The 1943 Gladney Letter
On May 18, 1943, Edward L. Gladney, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney
General, authored a letter to the State Mineral Board detailing the validity
and viability of State Lease 309.230 Much like the earlier analyses of the
Win or Lose leases, Gladney concluded as to State Lease 309 that, “[t]here
is no evidence to indicate fraud in connection with this lease and its
amendment. Certainly a suit should not be filed based upon nothing more
than ‘suspicious circumstances.’”231
State Lease 309 was a lease obtained by James A. Noe in his own
name.232 Noe was not the Governor at the time, but rather was a Louisiana
State Senator. Although this lease is not a W.T. Burton lease, it eventually
became part of the Win or Lose assets.233
In addition, Gladney reviewed the applicable law at the time.
Regarding whether Noe was a proper lessee and whether Governor Allen,
as a shareholder in the Win or Lose Corporation, could authorize such a
lease, Gladney found that:
At no time during any of the foregoing transactions [(i.e., the
227. Id.
228. See Warren L. Mengis, The Public Records Doctrine Revisited,
Presentation at the 37th Annual Louisiana Mineral Law Institute (Mar. 29, 1990).
229. Gensler Letter, supra note 187, at 2–3.
230. See generally Letter from Edward L. Gladney, Jr., Special Assistant Att’y
Gen., to State Mineral Board (May 18, 1943) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice)
[hereinafter Gladney Letter].
231. Id. at 15.
232. Id. at 2–3.
233. Noe assigned his interests in State Lease 309 “to the Win or Lose
Corporation on November 20, 1934, in exchange for [ninety-eight] shares of its
stock.” Id. at 5.
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bidding and leasing process)] was there a prohibitory statute that
rendered Noe (State Senator from May 9, 1932 to February 26,
1935, and Lieutenant Governor from February 26, 1935 to January
28, 1936, and Governor from January 28, 1936 to May 12, 1936)
ineligible to bid on and secure a lease on State mineral lands. Nor
was Governor Allen, a shareholder in the Win or Lose
Corporation, enjoined by statute from owning stock in a
corporation securing oil or gas rights under a State lease granted
to another by him.234
This analysis led Gladney to the conclusion that there were no illegal
or unlawful actions that resulted in the leasing of State Lease 309.235
In addition to the initial leasing of State Lease 309, subsequent
questions were raised regarding whether sufficient development of the
lease had occurred to maintain the 3,300 original acres of the lease.236
During the issuance of the lease in 1934 and the amendment of the lease
related to possible development insufficiencies in 1935, six wells were
drilled. Subsequent to the amendment, Gladney notes that an additional 35
wells were drilled on the property by May 11, 1943, for which the State
received $159,137.85 in royalties.237 Thus, concluding that there had been
sufficient development of the lease to maintain it as to the entire acreage.238
Gladney also went to great lengths to examine the validity of the
amended agreement to and the assignments of State Lease 309.239 The
latter is of particular import to the current inquiry, as it is through
assignments that the Win or Lose Corporation acquired its interests in all
of the leases noted in this report. Gladney, after reviewing the
circumstances surrounding these assignments and the amendment, found
234. Id. at 15.
235. Id.; see also id. at 9, in which Gladney notes that
We are not aware of any charge of fraud in the granting of the lease on
October 23, 1934. But on [sic] irregularity has been noted. It is, in our
opinion, of no legal consequence. Noe’s bid failed to respond to the
published notice in that it did not offer to the State a bonus.
With regard to this “irregularity Gladney noted that, because the main aim of the lease
was development and the acquisition of royalties by the State, it could not be said that
the lack of a bonus was problematic and that, regardless of the lack of adherence to
the notice, it was well within Governor Allen’s discretion to grant the lease if he
believed such a bid was in the best interests of the State. Id. at 9–10.
236. Id. at 5–9.
237. Id. at 9. A very rough calculation of the inflationary value of this $159,137.85
figure from 1943 in 2016 dollars is $2,220,828.49. In addition, Gladney notes that the
State also received $73,500.00 during this period in rentals from State Lease 309 (or
$1,025,720.12 in 2016 dollars). Id. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl [https://perma.cc/5VUN-7XQ7].
238. Gladney Letter, supra note 230, at 9.
239. Id. at 11–15.
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no legal error sufficient to invalidate the lease.240 Further, Gladney stated
that, with regard to a State Mineral Board’s resolution seeking that the
Attorney General, “recover for the State ‘all profits or overriding royalties
fraudulently or illegally obtained . . . .’”241
In analyzing State Lease 309, problems concerning recovery were also
expressed. Gladney characterized these problems, by stating:
Unless and until the lease be annulled and [set] aside, we can
conceive of no legal theory under which the State would have a
right to participate in the profits derived from the sale of the
lessee’s interest. Even if the contract is invalidated, we can find
no precedent in Louisiana jurisprudence which [sic] would permit
recovery by the State of profits from the transaction to which it is
not a party.242
As is evident from the analysis of numerous legal theories, the same
lack of privity between the State and the third party assignees and others
exist today as it did in 1943. Thus, the same problem of recovery exists.243
Also important in the 1943 Gladney Memorandum is a discussion of
Gensler’s 1941 Memorandum analyzing the validity of State Lease 309.244
In this discussion, Gladney acknowledges that Gensler originally called
for the filing of suit to annul State Lease 309.245 However, as Gladney
correctly noted, Gensler’s analysis was preliminary and the latter called
for additional research prior to the filing of such a suit.246 Gladney’s 1943
Memorandum is the additional research called for by Gensler two years
before.247 This more comprehensive examination identified no legal basis
on which to challenge State Lease 309, leading Gladney to conclude that
“on the basis of all evidence before us . . . a suit by the State could not be
successfully maintained and should not be instituted.”248

240. Id.
241. Id. at 13.
242. Id.
243. The difference between the current report and Gladney’s 1943 Memorandum
in terms of the statement that “we can conceive of no legal theory . . . ” is that, rather
than Gladney’s conclusory statement regarding a lack of a legal theory, this article,
examines the possible applicability of a panoply of potential theories to the facts of
this matter.
244. Gladney Letter, supra note 230, at 16.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 17.
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III. IMPLICATED LEASES
The historic litigation related to the Win or Lose Corporation made
few substantive inquiries. Aside from some of the tangential matters
addressed in the cases above, the main questions still remain: (1) whether
certain State leases issued during the gubernatorial terms of Oscar K. Allen
and James A. Noe are lawful and valid leases; (2) if the leases are not
lawful and valid, what can be done to cancel the leases today and whether
such action by the State is advisable; and (3) regardless if the leases were
lawful or valid, whether the State was fairly and properly compensated
under the leases. In order to answer these questions, the implicated leases
must be identified and the field of inquiry must be narrowed to define the
leases to which these questions should apply.
A. State Leases Involved in the Win or Lose Matter
A comprehensive review of Louisiana’s public records has identified
which parties held the subject State leases. No leases identified Win or
Lose as the original lessee from the State. Further, Win or Lose, Huey P.
Long, Oscar K. Allen, Seymour Weiss, and Earle Christenberry were never
direct lessees from the State. The only individuals identified in Part II of this
article with a direct lessor-lessee relationship with the State were W.T.
Burton, James A. Noe, and, much later, Independent Oil & Gas Company.
Further research has revealed that State Leases 309, 318, 334, 335,
340, 341, 343, and 344, were in part, held by or assigned to James A. Noe,
Seymour Weiss, Earle Christenberry, or Win or Lose Corporation during
the period between the formation of the Win or Lose Corporation and the
end of James A. Noe’s term as governor. It is well documented that Noe’s
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gubernatorial successor, Richard W. Leche, was unfriendly to Noe;249
thus, making it unlikely that the former would have participated in or
allowed Noe to skirt the law and illicitly acquire mineral leases from the
State. It is doubtful that any undue influence of the Office of the Governor
bore on mineral leases in favor of Win or Lose Corporation following
Noe’s departure. Finally, Act No. 93 of 1936 substantially curtailed the
plenary authority of the Governor of Louisiana regarding the issuance of
mineral leases on State lands. This Act established the Louisiana State
Mineral Board and vested leasing authority under the auspices of that
body.250 Following the enactment of this law, which went into force on
June 26, 1936, the Governor could no longer unilaterally issue State
mineral leases, whether those issuances were based on the State’s best
interests or the currying of political favor. Accordingly, with the Long,
Allen, and Noe cronyism gone and the State Mineral Board serving as a
check on the Governor’s leasing power, there is no compelling reason to
examine the legality of post-1936 leases.
B Leases That Need No Examination
There are several leases, though initially appearing to be related to the
Win or Lose matter, that do not merit any examination. These include
leases that predate the Win or Lose period but were held by someone with
a later-acquired interest in the Win or Lose leases or corporation, and also
249. Governor Leche ascended quickly from relative obscurity. He was Huey
P. Long’s campaign manager in the Second Congressional District in 1930; he
became secretary to Governor O.K. Allen, and by 1934, he was appointed to the
Orleans Parish Court of Appeal. SINDLER, supra note 28, at 119. After Huey
Long’s assassination in 1935, the Long political machine almost immediately
broke apart. A split occurred in the Long machine, resulting in two major factions,
each lead by a triumvirate of men. KANE, supra note 28, at 149; SINDLER, supra
note 28, at 118; WHITE, supra note 12, at 268–69. The Reverend G.L.K. Smith,
Earle J. Christenberry, and James Noe comprised the faction that held to Huey
Long’s Share-Our-Wealth economics as well as his anti-New Deal, antiRoosevelt policies. The second faction, led by Robert Maestri, Seymour Weiss,
and Abe Shushan, was the more conservative faction, seeking to preserve the
political machine above all else. KANE, supra note 28, at 444. It was the latter
faction that supported Leche for governor. James A. Noe had the chance to route
Leche in his own run for governor, especially after O.K. Allen’s death. However,
many of Noe’s initial supporters (especially G.L.K. Smith and Seymour Weiss)
turned their backs on him in favor of Leche’s candidacy. Although Noe eventually
made peace with these people and even secured a seat as a Louisiana State Senator
in the election, there was resentment between himself and the others from 1936
forward. McManus, supra note 10, at 27–33.
250. The State Mineral Board is now officially known as the Louisiana State
Mineral and Energy Board (SMEB)—a name change that occurred pursuant to Act
No. 196, 2009 La. Acts. 1981 (currently LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:121 (2009)).
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leases that have lapsed and can no longer be challenged. The only leases
that remain active and were issued or assigned during Oscar K. Allen’s or
James A. Noe’s terms as governor are State Leases 309, 334, 335, 340,
341, and 344. These leases are the subject of each of the following legal
inquiries. However, the legal conclusions as to these leases apply the same
as to the lapsed leases.
IV. CURRENT LEGAL THEORIES
There is no real legal or factual basis on which the State can claim a
share of the lessees’ royalties from the Win or Lose leases. Lessee’s
royalty shares, by their very nature, are that portion of the monies realized
by mineral production that are retained by the lessee in exchange for the
risks and expenses involved in mineral exploration and production.251
Under the Louisiana law in force at the time the subject leases were
granted, the interest share of production to lessees was set at a maximum
of 87.5%.252 The State had and continues to have no claim, under general
mineral law principles, to the lessee’s share of mineral production. Thus,
the following legal theories, while presented and analyzed here as they
apply to these leases, are only viable if it can be proven: (1) that the State
has been underpaid its share by the original lessees; or (2) that the leases
were issued illegally or were not issued in the best interests of the State.
Because the State received its legally-required share of 12.5% from the
Win or Lose leases—no less than the same share was received from other
winning bidders at the time—it is difficult, if not impossible, to say that
the State did not enter into the subject leases with its best interests in mind.
As to the State’s interests in the subject leases, the analysis that
follows has little practical application to “undoing” the Win or Lose leases.
The reason, as stated throughout this article, is that since the State received
its proper share of the minerals produced, any legal theories to invalidate
these leases are useless because the State cannot show it suffered any harm
or damages. Regardless of whether the legal theories reviewed herein are
valid, the State still would have received its mandatory share of 12.5%. As
is later discussed more fully, it is doubtful whether it would be in the
State’s best interests to “undo” any of the Win or Lose leases today. While
the following analysis may be used by heirs or descendants of the lessees
to argue that certain of their interests vis-à-vis each other were not properly
granted, such would constitute private causes of action in which the State
cannot become involved.
251. 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:181 (4th ed. 2015); see also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 31:123 (2016).
252. Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606.
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A. Malfeasance in Office
The current version of the law prohibiting malfeasance in office, La.
R.S. 14:134,253 is a manifestation of two former statutes. These statutes,
which were the laws in force in the 1930s, are: Acts 1912, No. 254 (general
malfeasance in office), and R.S. 1870, § 872 (failure of officer to perform
duty).254
Acts 1912, No. 254 § 1 is substantially similar to the current law in that it
prohibits a civil officer from: “willfully fail[ing], refus[ing], or neglect[ing] to
perform any official duty required of him . . . or [from] perfom[ing] any such
duty in an unlawful manner . . . or permit[ting] any . . . officer, under his
authority, to [do the same].”255 However, the former statute is stricter because
it contains the phrase “required of him, personally, by law” rather than “any
duty lawfully required of him.” According to the comments to La. R.S.
14:134, the current phrasing includes the neglect or wrongful performance of
any properly required duty, which would include administrative and
departmental rules.256
For a violation of the 1912 law to be found, the following elements
must be proven: (1) the actor be a civil officer or an officer under a civil
officer’s authority as contemplated by the statute; (2) the actor had an
official duty required of him, personally, by law; and (3) the actor either
neglected to perform such a duty or performed such a duty in an unlawful
manner.257 The remedy that existed under this law in the 1930s was that
the officer “shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by being condemned to pay a fine
not to exceed five hundred dollars, or to suffer imprisonment, not
exceeding six months, or both, at the discretion of the court.”258
Thus, a review of the malfeasance in office laws of the time reveals
that such a law would not apply to Oscar K. Allen’s or James A. Noe’s
253. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:134 (enacted in 1980 in modern form).
254. Although the official comments to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:134 note
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 872 (1870) as a source for the current law, a review of that
section reveals that that former law is essentially a penal provision that would
accompany a mandamus action under the current LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3861,
et seq., for the failure of a public official to undertake an action that he or she is
required to do under the law. All of the Win or Lose-related activities (i.e., leasing,
etc.) would not qualify as mandatory duties. See, e.g., Allen v. St. Tammany
Parish Police Jury, 690 So.2d 150, 153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97) (“Mandamus
will not lie in matters in which discretion and evaluation of evidence must be
exercised.”). Thus, mandamus (and presumably an action under LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 872 (1870)) would not lie against any party to the Win or Lose matter.
255. Act No. 254, § 1, 1912 La Acts. 563.
256. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:134, cmt.
257. See id.
258. Id.
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granting of the Win or Lose leases, as there is no proof that they either
neglected to perform such a duty or performed such a duty in an unlawful
manner. The penalty for violating this law is against the public officer.259
If proof existed of this activity, the only remedy for the State would be a
conviction of one or more governors who died decades ago—an
impossibility. The best the State could hope for if it chose to use this theory
to attack the Win or Lose leases is that the acts of the long-deceased
governors would be found unlawful and thus nullified. As is noted
throughout the article, no evidence of such unlawful action has been found.
Thus, proving malfeasance in office is highly unlikely.
B. Ethical Violations–Ethics Laws in 1936
Had they happened today, the mineral leasing actions of Oscar K.
Allen and James A. Noe during their terms as governor, from 1934 through
1936, would certainly violate current ethics statutes.260 The problem with
applying modern concepts of governmental ethics to the Win or Lose
matter is that such laws did not exist in Louisiana at the time of the
occurrence of any of the actions reviewed here. Because there were no
prohibitions to this activity in the 1930s, neither can it be said that the
governors acted unethically (from a legal, not a moral, perspective), nor
that they created absolutely null contracts by knowing that they were likely
to reap a benefit from the leases.
C. Bid Collusion
Certain allegations have been made that the letting of the Win or Lose
leases in the 1930s constituted unlawful bid collusion.261 Collusive bidding
is defined as the illegal attempt by conspiring bidders to circumvent rules
and laws drawn to ensure free and competitive bidding.262 The general idea
behind these allegations is that the letting of the Win or Lose leases in such
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1112 (prohibiting public servants from
“participating in a transaction in which he has a personal substantial economic
interest”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1116(C) (prohibiting the participation of a
regulatory employee “in the sale of goods or services to a person regulated by his
public agency”). It is likely that these modern laws would prohibit the sort of
public/private activities that led to the Win or Lose leasing.
261. See, e.g., Lee Zurik, Lee Zurik Investigation: The Texaco Connection, Fox 8
WVUE, May 15, 2012, fox8live.com/story/18428728/the-texaco-connection [https:
//perma.cc/MV5R-5VDK] (noting that a former State employee questioned the
collusion of parties with regard to some of the Win or Lose-related leases).
262. See Collusive Bidding Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
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a manner—one that ultimately benefited the Win or Lose Corporation—
constituted bid collusion as between Allen and Noe and the
lessees/assignees of these leases.
In Louisiana, bid collusion is prohibited under the Louisiana Antitrust
Law found at La. R.S. 51:121, et seq. Although the Louisiana Antitrust
Law, in its current iteration, is a law of recent vintage,263 we note that
contemporaneously with the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (Sherman Act), the Louisiana Legislature passed Act
86 of 1890, containing a provision similar to that found in the Sherman
Act. This act stated that every contract or combination in restraint of trade
was declared to be illegal.264
In 1892, the Legislature enacted Act 90, thereby adding new sections
to Act 86 of 1890.265 Particularly, Act 90 prohibited the formation of trusts
and the entering into agreements by individuals, firms, corporations, or
other entities in order to influence trade in any manner as to affect
prices.266 The Act also provided for the revocation of the charters of
corporations violating the provisions of this Act and prohibited foreign
corporations that violated the Act from doing business in this State.267
Additionally, Act 90, § 7 made explicit that “any contract or agreement in
violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be absolutely void.”268
Following the same principle, Act 11 of the Extraordinary Legislative
Session of 1915 declared illegal, “every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in
the State of Louisiana.”269 In addition, Act 11 established the penalty for
violators at $5,000, or imprisonment with or without hard labor, not
exceeding three years. In addition, the Act provided general procedure
guidelines to prosecute the violators. Therefore, Act 11 of 1915 is
particularly relevant to this analysis because it would control any
combinations, conspiracies, or monopolies that presumably were in
violation of the antitrust law in the 1930s.

263. It was amended to its present form in 2003.
264. Act No. 86 § 1, 1890 La. Act 1806 reads, in relevant part, as follows:
[E]very contract, combination in the form of trust, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce to fix or limit the amount or quantity of
any article, commodity or merchandise to be manufactured, mined,
produced or sold in this State is hereby declared illegal.
265. Act No. 90, 1892 La. Act 120-22.
266. See id.
267. Id. at §§ 2–3.
268. Id. at § 7.
269. In State v. McClellan, 98 So. 748, 749 (La. 1923), the Louisiana Supreme
Court held Act 90 of 1892 (and thus Act 86 of 1890) to be superseded by Act 11,
thus making Act 11 the only law applicable to the current matter.
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Two elements must be established to prove that bid collusion is
present under Act 11 of 1915: (1) the existence of a contract, combination,
or conspiracy; and (2) the restraint of trade or commerce.270 Note that the
reference to “restraint of trade” includes only contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies that are unreasonable restraints of trade.271 Because proving
concerted actions is essential to establishing a violation of Act 11, vague
allegations of conspiracy or collusion will be vulnerable to dismissal.272
Thus, the complaint must describe the nature of the alleged conspiracy and
that the actions of the co-conspirators resulted in an unreasonable restraint
to commerce. Circumstantial evidence has been determined to be
admissible in proving an antitrust violation.273 If bid collusion had in fact
taken place in the Win or Lose matter, then the contract involving such
collusion would be null and void.274 Based on a review of the testimony
set forth in U.S. v. Noe, there is little question that there was a
“combination” of individuals in the Win or Lose matter that plotted to
obtain mineral leases from the State.275 Based on the available evidence,
however, it is impossible to maintain that any of the actions of the subjects
of this article amounted to a “restraint of trade” under Act 11 of 1915.
Speaking to the question of whether certain activity constitutes a restraint
of trade, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that:
The test of the illegality of a combination or an attempt to create
a monopoly is not what the combination or attempted monopoly
has accomplished, but what may be accomplished; not what has
been done, but what may be done once the participants get in
power to accomplish their purpose. If the natural tendency or
probable effect of the combination or monopoly is the restraint of
trade by stifling competition or to discourage enterprise and
industry, the combination or monopoly is deemed to be
detrimental to the public welfare and falls within the teeth of the
law.276

270. See Act No. 11, 1915 La. Acts 23.
271. See Wolf & Co. v. Orleans Lumber Co., 149 So. 322, 324 (La. App. Orl.
1933).
272. See also J.W. Rombach, Inc. v. Parish of Jefferson, 670 So.2d 1305 (La. App.
5 Cir. 2/14/96) To this point, no Louisiana cases could be identified from the period
of the 1930s. Thus, we rely on more recent cases to support this proposition.
273. Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996 (3rd Cir. 1994).
274. See, 1980-81 La. Op. Att’y Gen. 29 (1980) (citing Coleman v. Bossier
City, 305 So.2d 444 (La. 1974)).
275. See generally United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8.
276. Tooke & Reynolds v. Bastrop Ice & Storage Co., 135 So. 239, 243 (La.
1931); see also Wolf & Co., 149 So. at 325.

120

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. V

Thus, the mere fact that the Win or Lose transactions were a result of
collusion or concerted action by the subjects of this report is not enough
to constitute a “restraint of trade,” nor is the fact that such actions may be
distasteful by modern moral standards sufficient to create a legal violation.
The law requires not only collusion, but also the creation of a scheme by
which competition is stifled. It simply cannot be said that the Win or Lose
leases led to any stifling of the exploration for or production of oil and gas
in Louisiana. Indeed, that industry boomed several times after the Win or
Lose transactions had been consummated.277 Therefore, bid collusion, as
it has been interpreted and applied by the Louisiana courts at the time of
the Win or Lose activity, is not applicable to this matter as there was no
restraint of trade involved.
Further, because the available evidence indicates that all of the
applicable laws at the time were followed with regard to the letting of these
leases, an unreasonable restraint of trade did not occur. Certainly, other
parties were shut out of operating mineral activities on the leased property,
but such was accomplished pursuant to a legislatively created public bid
process. To the extent that the leases herein can be said to restrain trade by
their nature (i.e., restricting the area to competitive mineral activities), then
such is a legally sanctioned restraint, which cannot be unlawful.278 With
the foregoing said, in the interest of completeness, because bid collusion
is one of the few laws that can rely on circumstantial evidence as a basis
for upsetting contracts, a further examination of the viability of such an
action is here undertaken.279
Although not specified in Louisiana antitrust law, it has been
determined that the prescriptive period for monopoly and antitrust claims
is the same as that for tort actions; therefore, the prescriptive period of

277. See, e.g., Robert Gramling & William R. Freudenburg, A Closer Look at
“Local Control”: Communities, Commodities, and the Collapse of the Coast, in
55 RURAL SOCIOLOGY 541, 543–46 (1990) (discussing the 1970s-1980s oil boom
in Louisiana and the historic rise in oil-related activities and economies in
Louisiana from the 1940s through the 1980s); Boris Morozov, Budgeting
Practices and Experiences in Louisiana: From the Traditional 1990s to the
Dramatic 2000s, in 25 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING & FIN. MGMT. 243,
244–45 (2013) (noting a post-Katrina/Rita oil boom in Louisiana).
278. In this regard, the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that Act 11 of 1915
was not intended to restrain lawful activity that acts as a restraint to trade. State v.
Am. Sugar Refining Co., 71 So. 137, 144–45 (La. 1916).
279. This examination assumes that the circumstances that a lease was
awarded by a governor (Allen or Noe) to a business partner (Burton) who
immediately reassigned the lease to a joint venture of the two (Win or Lose) would
constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a bid collusion cause of
action absent any other mitigating problems to proving those circumstances (of
which there are several in this situation that are reviewed in Part V).
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such a claim is one year.280 In State ex rel. Ieyoub v. Bordens, Inc.,281 the
State filed a parens patriae petition against a milk supplier pursuant to the
antimonopoly statute, alleging bid-rigging in connection with school milk
contracts.282 The petition alleged a bid-rigging scheme that affected the
ability of the schools to receive fair, competitive bids and to pay
competitive prices on milk sold to Louisiana schools.283 The court
determined that the one year prescriptive period of the antitrust law, La.
R.S. 51:121, et seq., applied to this case.284 The one-year tort period runs
from the time the plaintiff acquired sufficient knowledge of the offense to
realize there was an injury.285 This “sufficient knowledge of the offense”
concept is akin to the theory of contra non valentum.286 Although
Louisiana courts have recognized this theory,287 prescription commences
from the point at which the plaintiff became aware of the wrong.288 In this
case, based upon the extremely vocal opposition to the Win or Lose leases
280. Lee v. City of Shreveport, 58 So.3d 601, 605–06 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/11),
writ denied, 62 So.3d 114 (La. 4/29/11). In Delta Theaters, Inc. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. La. 1958), appeal dismissed, 259 F.2d 563
(5th Cir. 1958), the court stated that actions under federal antitrust laws for
damages were “tort” actions within purview of former Article 3537 of the 1870
Civil Code, requiring such actions to be brought within one year. See also State
ex rel. Ieyoub v. Bordens, Inc., 684 So.2d 1024 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/27/96), writ
denied, 690 So.2d 42 (La. 3/14/97). Similarly, the Louisiana Second Circuit has
concluded that “[w]hether categorized as a monopoly [sanctioned by the antitrust
law] or a general delictual act, both classifications lend themselves to a one-year
prescriptive period.” Lee, 58 So.3d at 606.
281. 684 So.2d 1024 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/27/96), writ denied, 690 So.2d 42
(La. 3/14/97).
282. Id. at 1026.
283. Id.
284. Citing Loew’s Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 110 So.2d 553 (La. 1959);
Delaughter v. Borden Co., 364 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1966) and Diliberto v. Cont’l
Oil Co., 215 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. La. 1963). Borden argued that prescription runs
where the State asserts claims in its parens patriae capacity and here the one year
prescriptive period had run. The Attorney General countered that prescription
does not run against the State based on LA. CONST. art. XII, sec. 13, which
declares that “prescription shall not run against the state in any civil matter unless
otherwise provided in the constitution or expressly by law.” The court reasoned
that a parens patriae action brought by the State on behalf of its citizens has
elements of private and public enforcement. Even in federal cases, the passage of
the four-year period under federal law is used to bar actions by the states. See
Texas v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1988).
285. Delaughter, 215 F. Supp. at 864.
286. Doctrine of Contra Non Valentem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
287. See, e.g., Hazelwood Farm, Inc. v. Liberty Oil and Gas Corp., 844 So. 2d
380 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/2/03), writ denied, 857 So. 2d 476 (La. 10/31/03).
288. Id. See also Doctrine of Contra Non Valentem, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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since its inception,289 it is impossible to say that a contra non valentumtype theory would act to meaningfully extend the brief antitrust
prescriptive period in this matter.
Since the alleged collusion resulted in the issuance of potentially null
and void State leases still in operation, this article must explore whether
such an action has set in motion a “continuous tort” on which prescription
does not begin until the conduct causing the damages is abated.290
However, in order for a case to qualify as a continuing tort, the conduct
causing the damage must be continuous in nature, not the damages. 291 In
this situation, the conduct occurred in the 1930s. Thus, the time within
which to bring an action for a violation of the antitrust laws, such as bid
collusion, has long passed. Thus, even if Act 11 could be used to invalidate
the Win or Lose leases if they were found to result from activity prohibited
by that Act, the jurisprudence clearly demonstrates that any such action
has prescribed. However, it does not appear that the activity of those
involved in this inquiry even rises to the level of bid collusion sufficient
to trigger the application of Act 11 to this matter.
D. Fraud
There is no specific provision in the Louisiana Criminal Code that
covers a “crime of fraud,” per se. In the absence of an explicit crime of
fraud or a criminal definition of fraud, courts look to the relevant civil law
at the time. In the current Louisiana Civil Code, fraud is defined as “a
misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention
either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or
inconvenience to the other.”292 This article did not come into effect until
the Louisiana Civil Code was revised in 1984. However, the Revision
Comments to Louisiana Civil Code article 1953 state that: “[t]his Article
is new. It does not change the law, however. It restates the definition found
in C.C. Art. 1847(6) (1870).”293 Thus, the legal definition in place at the
times relevant to this research would have been essentially the same as the
definition found in the current Louisiana Civil Code article 1953.

289. See, e.g., W.R. Lence, Noe-Allen Oil and Gas Deals Reviewed, THE
SHREVEPORT T IMES, Nov. 22, 1935, at 1–2; Charge Allen Profited in Land Lease,
MORNING ADVOCATE, Nov. 28, 1935, at 5.
290. S. Cent. Bell Tel. v. Texaco, Inc., 418 So.2d 531, 533 (La. 1982). See also
Benton, Benton & Benton v. La. Pub. Facilities Auth., 672 So.2d 720, 723 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 4/4/96), writ denied, 679 So.2d 110 (La. 9/13/96).
291. Lee v. City of Shreveport, 58 So.3d 601, 605 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/11),
writ denied, 62 So.3d 114 (La. 4/29/11).
292. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953.
293. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953, cmt. a.
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Because there was no “crime of fraud” in the 1930s, it is somewhat
irrelevant to discuss the elements of such crime.294 However, parsing out
the civil elements of fraud, a fraudulent party would have to be found to
have made a misrepresentation or suppressed the truth in an attempt to
gain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause loss or inconvenience
to another.295 As has been noted throughout this article, because there is
no indication that the State received anything less than its statutorilyguaranteed royalty share of 12.5% from the Win or Lose leases, “loss or
inconvenience” is unlikely to be proven as against the State’s interests.
Such an allegation would rest on speculation that the State would have
received a more advantageous bid and lease terms had the Burton and Noe
bids been rejected. Yet, that is not possible to know.
Whether the Win or Lose leases satisfy the other component of fraud
again requires evidence that is not present. Clearly, Burton and Noe
obtained an advantage with these leases. The question lies with whether
the advantage was unjust. They did not, as is shown herein, break any laws
at the time (nor is there evidence of such activity) to obtain this advantage.
Thus, it is hard to say that the advantage was unjust. Also necessary to
succeed on this theory, it would have to be proven that Burton and Noe
made “misrepresentation[s] or . . . sup[p]ress[ed] . . . the truth” to obtain
the advantage.296 Although it is possible to infer such misrepresentations
or suppressions, no clear evidence of such activity has been identified.
With respect to these requirements, the lack of proof is a virtual bar to
utilizing a fraud theory in either a criminal or a civil sense as against any
of the Win or Lose leases. It is possible that fraudulent receipt of the
subject mineral leases could invalidate them under a theory that such
activity was contrary to the morals of the 1930s (contra bonos mores) or
due to the fact that fraud is a vice of consent.297 However, this is a
problematic prospect as morality and values have adapted over time,
making morality judgment calls on what was and was not acceptable in
the 1930s largely speculative. In many ways, the idea that laws exist to
designate a distinction between morality and immorality complicates
matters with regard to the Win or Lose situation.298 In this regard, the
question remains whether the laws have already set the bounds of morality.
If so, then by virtue of the Legislature not barring such activity, the actions
of those related to the Win or Lose matter may have been deemed moral
294. It is important to note in this regard that several of the other legal theories
reviewed herein were likely surrogates for an actual crime of “fraud” in the 1930s.
295. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953.
296. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953.
297. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1948.
298. JACQUES P. THIROUX & KEITH W. KRASEMANN, ETHICS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 8–10 (Glencoe 1977).
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at the time (although distasteful by modern standards). Alecia Long,
addressing the changing of social mores over time, provided that, “it was
simply assumed that in order to get deals done a certain amount of graft
would be taken off the top of any particular deal.”299 Indeed, a recent
publication has discussed the differing moral standards of the 1920s and
1930s from other American periods, making any morality determination
with regard to the Win or Lose matter tenuous and complex at best.300
Thus, the prospect of getting at objective measures of morality, at least
using existing methodologies, is impossible.301 Thus, it is difficult to
conceive the question regarding the morality of individuals being put
before a court. In fact, this reality harkens to the admonition of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in McGuigin v. Ochiglevich that courts should
not dabble in divining the morality of certain activities.302 In addition to
the inherent difficulties in divining moral judgments from more than seven
decades ago, the data on public opinion from that period (which is a
presumptively reasonable surrogate for morality if the correct questions
are asked) has internal problems and has scarcely been analyzed to date.303
Thus, making analyses of the Win or Lose activities by comparison to
other data is practically impossible at this time. However, under either
theory, proof of Win or Lose receiving interests in the leases by fraud is
necessary and such proof has not been identified sufficient to support a
legal cause of action.
E. Were there Violations of the Bid Process in the 1930s with the Win or
Lose Leases?
As noted throughout this article, it is not sufficient that the Win or
Lose leases were let in a manner that does not comport with the public
leasing of minerals today. Rather, in order for these leases to be considered
ill-gotten gains by the former governors and their associates, the leasing
must have violated the law in force at the time. This subpart addresses the
question of what was the law of public mineral leasing at the time of the
Win or Lose leases.

299. Zurik one, supra note 3.
300. See generally Melissa E. Weinbrenner, Movies, Model Ts, and Morality:
The Impact of Technology on Standards of Behavior in the Early Twentieth
Century, in 44 J. OF POPULAR CULTURE, 647 (2011).
301. Gabriel Abend, Two Main Problems in the Sociology of Morality, 37
THEORY AND SOC’Y 87 (2008).
302. 18 La. Ann. 92 (La. 1866).
303. See Adam J. Berinsky, American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s:
The Analysis of Quota-Controlled Sample Survey Data, in 70 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 499
(2006).
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1. What Were the Steps and Were They Followed?
John Madden has characterized the pre-1936 law related to mineral
leasing from the State as: “confusing, left much to conjecture, and
appeared to vest too much authority in the Governor.”304 Nonetheless, it is
this pre-1936 mineral lease law that governs the leases acquired by the
Win or Lose Corporation that are the subject of this article.
A series of legislative acts embodied the statutory standards governing
the issuance of oil and gas leases in 1934 through 1936. Before the passage
of Acts 1928, No. 9 (Extraordinary Session), the Governor of Louisiana
was unilaterally authorized to lease State lands for oil and gas development
and enjoyed virtually complete discretion in providing for the terms and
conditions of the leases.305 With a few minor exceptions, the controlling
law for mineral leasing at the time of the letting of the Win or Lose leases
was governed by Acts 1915, No. 30 (Act 30). In pertinent part, that law
stated that, upon receiving an application for a mineral lease on State land:
[T]he Governor may cause to be published in the official journal
of the State and in the official journal of the parish wherein such
land is located and advertisement to be published for a period of
not less than fifteen days, setting forth therein a description of the
land to be leased by the State, the time when bids therefor will be
received, a short summary of the terms and conditions of the lease
or leases to be executed, and, in his discretion, the royalty to be
demanded should he deem it to the interests of the State to call for
bids on the basis of a royalty fixed by him . . . .306
This law was amended by Acts 1926, No. 315 (Act 315), but the
amendment resulted in only minor changes. This latter law stated that,
after the fifteen days noted in Act 30, the Governor was vested with full
authority to:
[E]xecute any lease or leases so granted, to the highest bidders
therefor, under such terms and conditions as to him seem proper;
provided that the minimum royalties to be stipulated in such leases
304. JOHN L. MADDEN, FEDERAL AND STATE LANDS IN LOUISIANA 415 (1973).
305. See Act No. 30, 1915 La. Acts 62–63; Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 60607, and Act No. 9, 1930 La. Acts 27 (passed by the 1928 Extraordinary Legislative
Session). See also Letter from Gaston L. Porterie, Attorney General, to Oscar K.
Allen, Governor (Jan. 23, 1936) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice) (opining on
the broad discretion of the Governor to grant mineral leases prior to the creation
of the State Mineral Board). See also William O. Bonin, Public Mineral Leasing
in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L. REV. 246, 246–47 (1953).
306. See Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 63.
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to be paid by the State shall be one-eighth of all the oil and gas
produced and saved from the property leased . . . .307
In 1928, the Register of State Lands acquired the authority to adjust,
settle, and determine, by agreement with the lessee and with the approval
of the Governor, all matters arising from the interpretation of oil and gas
leases granted by the State of Louisiana.308 The 1928 Act was limited in
scope and did not otherwise change any of the standards prescribed in the
1915 and 1926 acts, since it only amended section 1 of Act 30.309 Thus,
there were few standards imposed on the unilateral authority of Governors
Allen and Noe when they executed the subject mineral leases from 1934
through 1936. These standards, or the lack thereof, remained in force until
the Legislature changed the law in 1936 and created the Louisiana State
Mineral Board.310 Nonetheless, this legislative activity occurred
subsequent to the issuance of the subject leases.
Based upon the law in force at the time, the Governor, under Act 30,
had discretion to advertise mineral leases.311 Thus, because such
advertisements were not mandatory, it is irrelevant whether the Win or
Lose leases were advertised. Further, Act 315 set the minimum royalty for
State leases at 12.5%, but none of these Acts, including Act 30, required
the payment of a bonus or rental for mineral leases on State property.312
Accordingly, the 12.5% royalty interest reserved to the State in the Win or
Lose leases was consistent with the law in force at the time. Finally, Act 9
of the 1928 Extraordinary Session conferred on the State Land Office only
the authority to modify mineral leases when questions of interpretation
arose. This Act did not curtail the Governor’s plenary authority to grant
leases on terms that he deemed proper, in his discretion. Due to the lack of
standards for the issuance of mineral leases that existed at the time that the
Win or Lose leases occurred, there is no indication that these leases were
issued in contravention of the appropriate legal requirements at the time.
Another matter to consider in tandem with the granting of the leases is
whether the assignments of these leases to third parties—the manner in
which the Win or Lose Corporation obtained its interests in the subject
leases—were accomplished in a manner consistent with the law. Prior to the
creation of the State Mineral Board, there was no legislation in Louisiana
307. Act No. 315, § 4, 1926 La. Acts 607.
308. See Act No. 9, 1930 La. Acts 27 (passed by the 1928 Extraordinary
Legislative Session).
309. Id.; see also Act No. 30, 1915 La. Acts 63; Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606–
07.
310. See Act No. 93, 1936 La. Acts. 276–80.
311. Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 63. The authority is discretionary based
upon the presence of the term “may” in Section 3 of that Act.
312. Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606–07.
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that controlled or restricted the assignment of State mineral leases.313
Accordingly, in the absence of any law controlling or restricting such
transfers or assignments, it cannot be said that those assignments were
prohibited. Further, there are no obligations imposed upon the Governor or
any instrumentality of the State to adhere to any such nonexistent rules. It is
probable that the Governor or other State signatory to such assignments was
bound by a general fiduciary duty to the State in undertaking such
assignments. However, as is set forth throughout the article, because the
State has always received at least its minimum legal royalty share from the
subject leases, it is impossible to now conclude, that any assignments of
these leases constituted a derogation of any fiduciary duty to the State.
Further, in the absence of law to the contrary, as long as such assignments
or transfers did not adversely impact the State’s 12.5% royalty share, the
activities were agreements among private parties. There was no requirement
that the State approve said assignments nor even be notified of the
assignments. The lack of notice to the State and the essentially private nature
of those agreements are likely the reasons for the absence of some
assignments in the State’s records (e.g., the assignment of the Win or Lose
interest in State Lease 195)—they simply were not sent to the State because
there was no requirement to do so.
2. Were These Leases the Most Advantageous Leases to the State?
The question of whether a particular mineral lease is most
advantageous to the State is one that delves into the discretion of those
with authority to grant the leases. Today, the State Mineral and Energy
Board (SMEB) exercises such discretion.314 The SMEB benefits from a
staff of well-trained scientists, engineers, geographers, and accountants

313. A review of the relevant law in force at the time of the Win or Lose leases
is indicative of this reality. See Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 62-63; Act No.
315, 1926 La. Acts 606-07; and Act No. 9, 1930 La. Acts 27 (passed by the 1928
Extraordinary Legislative Session), none of which contain any language related
to mineral lease assignments. Indeed, Madden echoes this lack of a requirement
prior to 1936. MADDEN, supra note 304, at 423. Further, Madden also notes of the
1936 law that,
[I]t is recognized that a contention could be made, whether supportable
or not in law, that a transfer or assignment, in whole or in part, of a lease,
duly executed by the parties, is a firm contract, fait accompli in itself,
and that the legislature was without right within the sphere of its powers
to make such contract subject to State Mineral Board approval.
Id. Thus, although the requirement for the Mineral Board to approve assignments
has been embodied in law since 1936, the enforceability and utility of such actions
is questionable.
314. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:127.
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who are able to evaluate the bids and advise the Board regarding the
advantages of particular bids to the State.
During the examined time period, 1934–1936, the Governor held the
sole and complete discretion as to whether a particular lease should be
granted—a reality that carried with it the authority to decide if a particular
bid and resulting lease was the most advantageous to the State. Without
being able to interview any of the governors that were involved in the
leasing from this period, it is impossible to know what factors entered into
their analyses of the bids related to the Win or Lose Corporation.315 Some
seventy-plus years from the discretionary decisions that led to the granting
of the subject leases, the only means to examine the reasonableness (which
presumably should provide some insight into the advantageousness) of
these leases is to look to the numbers themselves. In furtherance of this
goal, data on all leases let by the State for a ten-year period surrounding
the subject leases (i.e., five years prior to 1934 and five years after 1936,
or 1929 through 1941)316 were collected and statistically examined in order
to obtain a better understanding of the relationship of these leases to others
at the time.
During the period examined, 1929 through 1941, the State let 267
mineral leases.317 These leases span the terms of seven governors—Huey
P. Long, Alvin O. King, Oscar K. Allen, James A. Noe, Richard W. Leche,
Earl K. Long, and Sam H. Jones. These leases also span the creation of the
State Mineral Board in 1936. The data analyzed for this inquiry include
the size (acreage) of the leases and the per-acre bid price in order to
determine whether the subject leases were inconsistent with other leases
at the time.
Generally, per-acre prices for mineral leases from the State during the
examined twelve-year period were often quite low (with a statisticallycorrected median per acre price of $2.54).318 Further, the size of state
315. An interesting historical side note to this reality comes from the hearsay
testimony of Earle J. Christenberry in the U.S. v. Noe trial, in which he commented
that both Long and Noe, at least with respect to State Lease No. 309, were
convinced that the royalties expected to be generated for the State by that lease
would constitute an important economic boon for the State. Thus, although the
requirement for the Mineral Board to approve assignments has been embodied in
law since 1936, the enforceability and utility of such actions is questionable. See
generally United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8 (citing testimony of
Earle J. Christenberry).
316. The period of time captured for this review actually amounts to twelve
years, because five years prior to the formation of the Win or Lose Corporation
(1934) were examined and five years after the end of Governor Noe’s term in
office (1936) were examined, thus providing twelve-years’ worth of data.
317. These leases are sequentially numbered between State Lease No. 219 and
State Lease No. 509.
318. See Seidemann, et al., supra note 4.
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mineral leases during the examined twelve-year period were often also
quite low.319 This reality is borne out by the median size for this twelveyear period being 500 acres.320
In the size examination, three leases—State Leases 318, 335, and
340—were all found to be significantly larger than the other leases issued
by the State during the subject time period.321 It is unclear whether the
governors issuing these leases abused their discretion by issuing leases that
were so large as to not be in the best interests of the State. Certainly, these
three leases are significantly larger than all of the others, but there were no
size restrictions on State leases at the time.
The first-time size restrictions were imposed on the public officials
responsible for issuing leases was in Acts 1936, No. 93 (Act 93).322 The
Act added sixteen sections to the original Acts 1915, No. 30 and repealed
all of the previous conflicting provisions.323 Section 7 of Act 93 prohibited
the issuance of leases greater than 10,000 acres.324 Had the per-acre price
for the leases been significantly lower than others at the time and the lease
size been significantly higher, it would be much easier to conclude that
such lease terms were unreasonable. However, that is not the case here.
The governors had the discretion to grant such large leases and it cannot
be said that the State did not get a reasonable price for these large areas.
Thus, even for State Leases 318, 335, and 340, it cannot be concluded that
the best interests of the State were not served by the granting of unusually
large leases.
On the whole, the statistical analyses undertaken as part of this project
lead to a conclusion that the Win or Lose leases were not unreasonable based
on the other leases that the State granted at the time. There is uncertainty
regarding the meaning of the larger sizes of State Leases 318, 335, and 340;
however, no direct line can be drawn between these large sizes and an
inference that an abuse of discretion occurred such that the leases were
invalid. Clearly, as to the price per acre that the State received, there was
nothing out of the ordinary when the Win or Lose leases are compared to all
of the leases from the subject time period. With the questionable nature of
the meaning of lease size results and the suggestion from the per-acre price
results that the Win or Lose leases were reasonable at the time, it is unlikely
that the governors that issued these leases did so on unreasonable terms or
abused their discretion in so issuing the leases. In the case of the subject
leases, the provisions of Act 30 governed the issuance of oil and gas leases
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 87.
See Act No. 93, 1936 La. Acts. 276-80.
Id. at § 21.
Id. at § 7.
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on State owned land. Because Governors Allen and Noe granted the leases
prior to the acreage restrictions of Act 93, there were no acreage limitations
when the subject leases were issued. Thus, the larger-sized leases, such as
State Leases 318, 335, and 340, were lawful.
F. Public Bribery and Corrupt Influencing
Some allegations suggested that W.T. Burton acquired the subject
leases by way of bribing or unlawfully influencing O.K. Allen and James
A. Noe. The alleged bribing suggests that Burton enticed Allen and Noe
to issue the leases to him (Burton) by agreeing to assign a portion of the
royalties to the Win or Lose Corporation.325 Such activity may have
occurred, but there is no extant proof that this was the case. Nonetheless,
this article reviews the applicable bribery and corrupt influencing laws and
discusses what would be necessary to prove such allegations.
A general bribery statute was passed in Louisiana in 1878, followed
by a similar statute enacted in 1890. In order to constitute public bribery,
the bribe given or received must be to influence one of the parties named
in Acts 1890, No. 78.326 A mutual agreement as to the purpose of the bribe
is not necessary, so long as the defendant alone has that purpose. In State
v. Dudoussat, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that public bribery
according to the 1890 statute is made up of two separate offenses—that of
receiving, and that of giving, the bribe to influence one of the parties
named in the statute.327 Finally, the act committed in pursuance of the bribe
does not have to be a legal act or an act within the official power and duty
of the official bribed; the act only needs to be related to the bribed official’s
position, employment, or duty.328
Acts 1890, No. 78 embodied the statutory authority relating to bribery
of public officials. The law provided that:
[A]ny person who shall directly or indirectly offer or give any sum
or sums of money, bribe, present, reward, promise or any other
thing to any officer, State, parochial or municipal, or to any
member or officer of the General Assembly with intent to induce
or influence such officer, or member of the General Assembly to
appoint any person to office, to vote or exercise any power in him
325. Lee Zurik, Lee Zurik Investigation: Who’s Still Making Money from ‘Dirty
Deeds’?, Fox 8 WVUE, May 8, 2012, fox8live.com/story/18169793/lee-zurikinvestigation [https://perma.cc/8KU6-RF8F] [hereafter Zurik two].
326. See J.N.H., Criminal Law–Bribery of a Public Officer, 5 LA. L. REV. 327,
327 (1943). These named parties are: “any officer, State, parochial or municipal, or to
any member or officer to the General Assembly . . . .” Act No. 78, 1890 La. Acts 62.
327. 17 So. 685, 687 (La. 1895).
328. See, e.g., State v. Addison, 64 So. 497, 498–99 (La. 1914).
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vested, or to perform any duty in him required with partiality or
favor, the person giving or offering to give, directly or indirectly,
and the officer or member of the General Assembly so receiving
or agreeing to receive any money, bribe, present, reward, promise,
contract, obligation or security, with the intent or for the purpose
or consideration aforesaid, shall be guilty of bribery, and on
conviction thereof shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less
than one nor more than five years, and fined not less than fifty nor
more than five thousand dollars.329
Since 1936, corrupt influencing has been considered a separate crime
from bribery. Acts 1920, No. 162 amended part of the original corrupt
influencing Acts 1878, No. 59, entitled, “An Act for the prevention and
punishment of bribery and corrupt practices in all legislative, judicial, or
ministerial offices.”330 The law of corrupt influencing at the time of the
subject lease issuances in 1934 through 1936 included the following
provision:
That any person who obtains or seeks to obtain money or other thing
of value from another person upon a pretense, claim or
representation that he can or will improperly influence in any
manner, by any means direct or indirect, the official action of any
judge . . . or other officer of this State, ministerial or judicial . . .
shall be guilty of a felony . . . .331
In order to establish a bribery claim, the State must prove that something
of value was given to a State officer in order to influence that officer to
exercise some vested power.332 In regard to Win or Lose, the vested power
would be the granting of a State lease. Presumably, the “something of value”
would be the promise by W.T. Burton to assign a portion of the granted leases
to an entity in which the grantor held an interest. Although such assignments
did occur and such a motive can be inferred, there is no proof of such a motive.
Indeed, the available information from Noe’s tax evasion trial seems to
indicate just the opposite: that Burton was sought out by Long, Allen, and Noe
as someone with experience in oil and gas operations and as someone with
the capital to finance the exploration and production of the Win or Lose
leases.333 Yet, such a scenario substantially undercuts an allegation that

329. Act No. 78, 1890 La. Acts 62.
330. Act No. 162, 1920 La. Acts 252 (amending Act No. 59, 1878 La. Acts 97).
331. Act No. 162, 1920 La. Acts 252.
332. See id.
333. See generally United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8 (citing
testimony of William T. Burton).
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Burton bribed public officials to obtain a benefit. Further, no evidence to the
contrary exists.
The applicability of the crime of corrupt influencing also does not
apply to the Win or Lose situation. As noted above, corrupt influencing
laws in the 1930s were intended to criminalize someone obtaining
something of value for a promise to unlawfully influence a public official.
There is no indication in the Win or Lose scenario that anyone accepted
anything of value on a promise to unlawfully influence the awarding of
State leases. In addition, the Win or Lose Corporation, through its later
iteration, Independent Oil & Gas Company, was liquidated in 1951 and no
longer exists as a potential defendant.334 Thus, this law is irrelevant to the
current analysis.
G. Conspiracy
Among the many allegations circulating involving the Win or Lose
matter, conspiracy is an oft-repeated refrain. The current criminal law
covering conspiracy is codified at La. R.S. 14:26. That law, which was
amended to its current form in 1950, 1977, and 2013, was preceded by one
provision that was in force during the Win or Lose period in question: Acts
1934 (3d E.S.), No. 2. This 1934 law criminalized the conspiracy of
defrauding the State of taxes and revenues.335 A conspiracy, refers to the
collusion of more than one individual to accomplish unlawful activity.336
Unlike attempt, conspiracy is a stand-alone, actionable crime.337 As is
evident from numerous sources cited herein and otherwise consulted in
this research, there is no doubt that more than one person colluded in the
Win or Lose activities. Indeed, at one time or another, as many as ten
natural or juridical persons may have been involved in the actions that the
Win or Lose Corporation undertook with regard to mineral leasing from

334. Some concept of extending any potentially available criminal penalties
against the corporation (or an individual) to the heirs of that corporation’s interests
is likely prohibited by the United States Constitution as an in personem forfeiture,
which has been identified as a type of bill of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9,
cl. 3. See also Bruce A. Baird & Carolyn P. Vinson, RICO Pretrial Restraints and
Due Process: The Lessons of Princeton/Newport, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1009,
1010 n.3 (1990).
335. Act No. 2, 1934 La. Acts 15 (passed by the Third Extraordinary
Legislative Session).
336. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:26.
337. Id. See also State v. Bagneris, 110 So.2d 123 (La. 1959); State v. Gunter,
23 So.2d 305 (La. 1945).
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the State.338 Thus, one element of conspiracy is undoubtedly satisfied as to
the Win or Lose State leases.
An allegation of criminal conspiracy for the acquisition of the Win or
Lose leases requires the consideration of whether a criminal act was
accomplished by the above-noted collusion.339 Because there is no proof
that the State was actually defrauded of revenues by the actions of the Win
or Lose-related individuals, and because no positive law has been
identified from the period of inquiry, it cannot be said that the actions of
the individuals associated with Win or Lose constituted criminal acts. In
addition, even if such an act is considered a criminal violation today,
retroactive application of substantive criminal law is impermissible.340
Therefore, this law is inapplicable to the instant scenario.
H. Lease Nullification for Immoral Object
The most viable remaining theory would be that of nullifying the Win
or Lose leases on the basis that the agreement to grant such a lease had an
immoral object. In Rosenblath v. Sanders, the Louisiana Supreme Court
made clear that, under article 1892 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, a
contract that has an immoral object is void.341 As previously noted, the
current governmental ethics laws were not in place during the relevant
time periods. However, the lack of a positive law prohibiting certain action
does not necessarily prevent a finding that the actions of Governors Allen
338. See generally United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8. The ten
referenced parties are: Huey P. Long, Oscar K. Allen, James A. Noe, Seymour
Weiss, Earle J. Christenberry, Alice Lee Grosjean, William T. Burton, M. S.
Rhodes, J. E. Farrell, and the Win or Lose Corporation.
339. See State v. D’Ingianni, 47 So.2d 731 (La. 1950).
340. A discussion of this principle was set forth by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Janecka v. Cockrell:
The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that “[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . ex
post facto law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.1. Although the text of the Ex Post
Facto Clause makes clear that it only limits the powers of legislatures, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged a similar limitation on the power of the
judiciary to render decisions that retroactively criminalize previously legal
conduct. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d
260 (1977) (holding retroactive application of Supreme Court case violated
defendants’ due process rights because it punished conduct that had been
considered innocent under previous case law); Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (holding that “an
unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied
retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law” and is prohibited
by the Due Process Clause).
301 F.3d 316, 322 n.9 (5th Cir. 2002).
341. 150 La. 882, 883-84 (La. 1922). The laws discussed in this case were the
laws in force in 1936.
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and Noe and W.T. Burton were nevertheless immoral, thus resulting in the
invalidation of these contracts.
In order to establish immorality, it must first be proven that at least a
portion of the object of the granting of the leases was to obtain an improper
financial benefit or that some law was violated. Obviously, the mere act of
entering into a mineral lease agreement is not inherently immoral, but the
analysis for this situation is more nuanced than a simple inquiry into
whether mineral leasing is, per se, immoral. The Louisiana Supreme Court
explained this concept of nullity through immorality in the 1866 case of
McGuigin v. Ochiglevich, stating:
It is not pretended that there is anything inherently immoral or
essentially criminal in the art of making sails, or in the act of
selling canvas. The trade of sail-making is in itself an eminently
useful and honorable one; it is indispensable to commerce, to
science, to civilization. A contract to supply canvas and sails
involves no patent turpitude, like a contract to rob, to murder, to
commit arson, to abet treason, which would be on its face
iniquitous, and for the enforcement of which the law grants no
action. It is obvious, therefore, that a distinction is to be made
between contracts immoral sui generis and those the object of
which is to supply, or do something which, innocent in itself, is
intended by one or both parties to subserve a purpose reprobated
by law or by good morals.342
With regard to the Win or Lose leases, it is incontrovertible that
mineral leasing by the State, in itself, is, as the McGuigin court noted
“eminently useful.”343 In order to determine whether the Win or Lose
leases fail the contract morality test, an inquiry into the motivations of the
lessor (the State, through Governors Allen and Noe, and others) and the
lessee (W.T. Burton and James A. Noe) would have to be undertaken. Had
this been done during these individuals’ lifetimes, a similar argument
could be made. Such an argument would roughly be that if Governors
Allen or Noe granted a mineral lease to W.T. Burton with the constructive
knowledge that the agreement would likely result in a financial benefit
solely to themselves, the original contract granting the lease might be void
for having an immoral object. Yet, these motives, cannot be supplied or
verified. In the absence of such evidence, and with the reality that the State
was compensated at the regular royalty rate for the time, these legal
theories are not usable as to the current matter.

342. 18 La. Ann. 92, 92 (La. 1866).
343. Id.
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Coco v. Oden also deals with a situation that involves a public official
entering into an immoral contract based on its position.344 Here, the
Louisiana Supreme Court was faced with a situation in which the Sheriff
of Allen Parish accepted a free railroad pass.345 The court found that “[t]he
contract set up by the defendant is contra bonos mores, it is immoral, and
it is against the public policy of the state.”346 In so finding, the court held
that the Sheriff “forfeited his office by the acceptance and use of such
pass.”347 As one of the potential consequences of entering into an immoral
contract as a result of one’s official position under the law of the 1930s,
Coco provides a useless potential result for the State—O.K. Allen and
James A. Noe left public office more than eight decades ago. Thus, their
forfeit of office would be meaningless.
Situations that would render a contract unlawful because it is against
sound morals, public policy, public rights, or public interests include:
contracts made with an alien enemy; contracts in general restraint of trade
or marriage; contracts for the perpetration, concealment, or compounding
of some crime; considerations impeding the course of public justice, as
dropping a criminal prosecution for a felony, or a public misdemeanor, or
suppressing evidence.348 Under the law of the 1930s, these examples of
violations of public morals likely did not exist or are provable in the
current matter.
Regarding whether an act contra bonos mores is sufficient today to
support an annulment of a contract—here, a State mineral lease—the
answer is likely in the negative. In McGuigin v. Ochiglevich, the court
categorically rejected the idea that mere “intention” would be sufficient to
prove that something was contra bonos mores:

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

79 So. 287 (La. 1918).
Id.
Id. at 288.
Id.
Ozanne v. Haber, 30 La. Ann. 1384 (1878).
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The immoral character of the contract does not result from a
simple inspection of its terms, but is remotely deduced by a
process of reasoning and casuistry involving questions of motive
and intention on the part of the vendor, and of knowledge on the
part of the vendee . . . . The whole inquiry, then, in cases of this
kind, would turn upon questions of intention, and the investigation
assumes a moral and metaphysical character. Attorneys at law
become casuists. The Court is converted into a Synod of
Theologians. The authority of Locke and Malebranche supersedes
the authority of Pothier and Domat, and the judgment of the Court
would present a solution of metaphysical problems, not a juridical
sentence. It is obvious to what absurd consequences we are led by
the doctrine of “intention” as taught by the lower Court. Civil
magistrates should be content to limit their labors to the
investigation and enforcement of civil contracts, and not
complicate and confuse their duties by entering the labyrinth of
subtleties in quest of hidden “intentions.”349
Thus, the law presumes that the true intention of parties is clear and
explicit on the face of their contracts, and that people, in their business
transactions, do not intend to violate the law or to make contracts for the
enforcement of which the law refuses a remedy. Hence, as the Louisiana
Supreme Court has noted, “when one party charges that the contract is
infected with an illegal intent, the burden of proof is imposed upon him to
establish this allegation.”350
This is a particularly problematic scenario for the Win or Lose matter,
as evidence of any actual intent is now impossible to acquire. The leases
bear no evidence of impropriety on their faces. As indicated, the leases are
consistent with the law and with similar leases of the time. Thus, there
appears to be no cause of action by the State to invalidate the Win or Lose
leases on the grounds that the leases were a result of immoral actions. Even
if the courts were willing to ignore the warnings of the Louisiana Supreme
Court in McGuigin to avoid looking to the metaphysical question of intent
to divine immorality, answering the question situation would be
impossible since all of the parties involved in the original transactions are
long-dead. In addition, the McGuigin court clearly articulates that, absent
clear evidence of wrongdoing, a court will not sit in judgment as to the

349. McGuigin v. Ochiglevich, 18 La. Ann. 92, 93 (La. 1866).
350. Stewart Bros. v. Beeson, 148 So. 703, 705 (La. 1933).
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morality of specific acts—such is not a judicial function.351 However,
another basis for annulment is that the contracts were illicit. As has been
noted at length in the above analyses, no evidence of illegality exists with
regard to these leases.
I. The Perez Cases
The series of cases related to Leander Perez and his efforts to obtain
and maintain mineral leases from various levee districts in Plaquemines
Parish are reviewed here based upon suggestions by media reports that
such cases may provide a legal mechanism for the State to invalidate the
Win or Lose leases.352 However, the factual distinctions between those
cases and the Win or Lose situation are so great as to render any holdings
in the Perez cases useless in any effort to rescind the Win or Lose leases.
Leander Perez, like Huey Long, is an almost mythical, larger-than-life
figure.353 The former judge and District Attorney for Plaquemines and St.
Bernard Parishes is best known today for his bigotry and staunch
opposition to integration of the New Orleans area schools in the 1950s and

351. See, e.g., City of Shreveport v. Sw. Gas & Elec. Co., 74 So. 559 (La.
1917) (noting that it is not a judicial function to pass judgment on the morality of
certain legislation). Indeed, in State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501, 509–10 (La. 7/6/00),
the Louisiana Supreme Court implies that morality judgments are left to the
Legislature and that the courts should examine acts only in light of those moral
judgments made through the enactment of laws. See also Allen v. Carruth, 32 La.
Ann. 444, 446 (La. 1880), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court notes that its
role is in interpreting morality only through the enforcement of the existing law.
In this regard, the court noted:
With the motives of public policy we have nothing to do, in the absence
of all restraint on the power of the owner in the terms of the law. If,
however, we were at liberty through our views of public policy to go
beyond the terms of the statute, we would hold that public morality
would best be subserved by enforcing the performance of obligations
legally entered into; that the interest of society and of individuals would
best be guarded by discountenancing all attempts to procure credit by the
renunciation of rights of property, and, after reaping the benefits of the
credit, seek to frustrate payment by an attempted exercise of the rights
renounced.
Id. In the end, although the bulk of the jurisprudence suggests that courts should
not be in the business of making moral judgment calls, it may be that in extreme
cases, such does occur. However, it seems unlikely that courts, based upon the
jurisprudence noted herein, would become involved in nuanced questions of
moral issues.
352. See, e.g., Zurik two, supra note 325.
353. JAMES CONAWAY, JUDGE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LEANDER PEREZ 5
(1973).
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1960s.354 However, long before such events, Perez was known as the boss
of Plaquemines Parish, controlling the parish with an iron fist.355
Within this historical framework, Perez, as the District Attorney of
Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes, and the ex-officio attorney for the
Buras and Grand Prairie Levee Districts, assisted those districts (from
1936 and 1938) in leasing mineral rights on district property to Delta
Development, Inc.356 Delta Development was a corporate entity that was
solely held by the Perez family.357 When challenged on the issuance of
these leases by the levee districts in the 1940s, Perez fought back, using
political clout to obscure the true nature of Delta Development and to
intimidate those who would challenge him.358 Perez went so far as to
obtain grand jury indictments of several levee district members, as well as
the then-Attorney General, Eugene Stanley, in an effort to fend off
inquiries into his issuance of the Delta Development leases.359 For a time,
Perez succeeded in maintaining the leases by continuing as counsel for the
levee districts, the parishes, and for Delta Development.360
Following Perez’s death, Plaquemines Parish (the successor-ininterest to the Buras and Grand Prairie Levee Districts) challenged the
validity of the Delta Development leases.361 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal dismissed the case against the Perez heirs and assigns,
holding that prescription had run and consequently that the parties could
not maintain their action.362 The Louisiana Supreme Court overturned the
fourth circuit, noting that Perez’s lies to the people and the courts in the
1930s and 1940s, in addition to his use of police power to intimidate his
opponents, constituted a bar to prescription in this matter. Thus, the case
was allowed to proceed.363

354. See generally GLEN JEANSONNE, LEANDER PEREZ: BOSS OF THE DELTA
(La. State Univ. Press 1977); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & DEMOCRACY: THE
CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1915–1972 (Univ. of Ga. Press 1999).
355. CONAWAY, supra note 353, at 5.
356. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 486 So.2d 129,
131–32 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Plaquemines Parish Comm’n
Council]. See also Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 502
So.2d 1034, 1041–42 (La. 1987) [hereinafter Delta Dev., Inc.].
357. Delta Dev., Inc., 502 So.2d at 1042–43.
358. Id. at 1046–53.
359. Id. at 1051–52.
360. Id. at 1046–53.
361. See generally Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council, 486 So.2d at 131
and Delta Dev., Inc., 502 So.2d 1034 (La. 1987).
362. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 486 So.2d 129,
143 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986).
363. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 502 So.2d
1034, 1061–63 (La. 1987).
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Although fascinating cases from a historical perspective, the fourth
circuit and supreme court Perez cases from the 1980s hold no useful
mechanisms for the State to use in a challenge to the Win or Lose leases.
The primary reason for this lack of utility is that these cases are about
liberative prescription, a legal theory for the extension of actions that is
generally inapplicable to the State under La. Const. Art. XII, Sec. 13.364
When the Delta Development matter returned to the fourth circuit in
1997, all but one of the Perez descendants had settled their disputes with
Plaquemines Parish.365 In this case, the court discussed some substantive
issues of relevance to the Win or Lose matter. However, much of this case
related to the original prescription issues—matters already determined
inapplicable by the Louisiana Supreme Court and, once again, dismissed
by the fourth circuit.366
The fourth circuit addressed the issue of whether Leander Perez
derogated his fiduciary duty to the levee districts by serving as both the
levee districts’ attorney and Delta Development’s attorney. The court
found that such a breach did occur and that the breach caused the leases to
be invalid.367 This result is not relevant to the Win or Lose matter. The
Perez court rested its decision—that Leander Perez breached his fiduciary
duty to the levee districts—on his position as the attorney for both the
levee districts and for Delta Development.368 Such a relationship did not
exist in the Win or Lose matter; thus, the holding in this case is
inapplicable. The fiduciary responsibilities of the governors in the Win or
Lose matter were set forth by the statutorily required minimum royalties
and lease terms for mineral leases. Further, these responsibilities were also
created legislatively by requiring adherence of such leasing to a public bid
process. As was noted previously, there has been no derogation of these
duties discovered in the Win or Lose matter.
Lastly, in the 1997 Perez case, the court examined whether the
remaining Perez descendant, who was not found to be complicit in any of
Leander Perez’s wrongdoings, was required to: “surrender the overriding
royalty interests, and the monies he has derived from them, because those
overriding royalty interests originally were acquired by his grandfather’s
breaches of fiduciary duty.”369 The court refused to impute the guilt of the
ancestor to the descendant. In this regard, the court stated that, “simply
364. See Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council, 486 So.2d at 143; Delta Dev.,
Inc., 502 So.2d at 1061–63.
365. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 688 So.2d 169,
172 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997).
366. Id. at 172–74.
367. Id. at 174.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 175.
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receiving the benefit of a fraud, without more, [does not] make[] one liable
for the fraud.”370 However, the court did provide that the Perez descendant
would be liable to Plaquemines Parish under a theory of unjust enrichment,
even though he was not criminally culpable for fraud.371 This finding by
the 1997 Perez court also is not significant to the Win or Lose matter. The
conclusion that the one Perez heir was liable to Plaquemines Parish based
upon his unjust enrichment was premised on the finding that the mineral
leases were acquired from the levee districts in a fraudulent manner.372 The
absence of proof of fraud in the acquisition of the Win or Lose leases from
the State undermines the application of an unjust enrichment theory in the
current matter. Indeed, because the State was not impoverished by the
acquisition of mineral leases by the Win or Lose Corporation, there is no
unjust enrichment. This conclusion is consistent with Judge Plotkin’s
concurrence in the 1997 Perez matter.373
V. MITIGATING FACTORS
Each of the above-discussed theories is fraught with legal and
logistical problems. This section briefly examines the most obvious of
those problems, which largely, if not completely, defeat any attempt to
invalidate or revoke the subject leases.
A. Evidentiary Problems
The primary obstacle to the State proving any case for wrongdoing
with regard to the Win or Lose leases is the lack of evidence. If such
wrongdoing occurred, its perpetrators did well in avoiding a paper trail
that could represent a smoking gun from an evidentiary perspective. Thus,
should the State bring an action for the revocation of the Win or Lose
leases, it will be faced with the reality that it has no actual, explicit proof
of wrongdoing.
Because the allegation of fraud is the primary charge levied against
the actors in the Win or Lose matter, this article will briefly review the
proof problems inherent in a successful prosecution of that theory. 374 As
was mentioned in the review of Perrault’s 1941 Memorandum,375 fraud is
370. Id.
371. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 688 So.2d 169,
175 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997).
372. Id. at 176.
373. Id. at 176–77.
374. The proof problems for the other theories reviewed herein are set forth in
their respective sections of this article.
375. See generally textual discussion supra part II.B.3.
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not presumed and the burden of proving it is high. In Hall v. ArkansasLouisiana Gas Co.,376 the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that, “[i]t is well
settled that one who alleges fraud has the burden of establishing it by legal
and convincing evidence since fraud is never presumed, and that to
establish fraud exceptionally strong proof must be adduced.”377 In other
words, although circumstantial evidence may be used to prove fraud, the
mere insinuation and innuendo upon which the current claims of fraud and
wrongdoing are based are not sufficient.
Review of the paper trail in this matter revealed that it contains
insufficient evidence of fraud or any other wrongdoing. 378 Indeed,
commenting on the possibility of fraud, years after his analysis of the
matter for the State, C.C. Wood stated “ . . . as far as I could see, we didn’t
have any evidence of fraud, at all.”379 There exist no inconsistencies in the
extant lease (i.e., State Lease 340, 341, and 344) documents to support a
fraud allegation. With no paper trail to demonstrate wrongdoing, live
testimony is the only other option. Thus, in order to prove fraud, the State
needs live testimony of the actors involved in the alleged fraudulent
activity. The existing testimony from U.S. v. Noe does not evidence any
fraud. All potential witnesses are now long dead and thus cannot be
interviewed. The lack of evidence of fraud or of any other wrongdoing in
this matter defeats any nonfrivolous challenge to the Win or Lose leases.
B. Good Faith of Third Parties
The Perrault Memorandum of July 15, 1941 reviewed the
requirements to invalidate certain State leases vitiated with several
irregularities: the large profits made by the original lessee resulting from
his assignment of the lease; the typewritten bids accepted by the State; and
the amount of the bid filled in blank places;380 the executed lease carrying
no cash consideration as called for by the advertisement; and instances
where a corporation in which public officials owned an interest finally
received by assignment interests in the leases. Perrault’s analysis
concluded that, despite the suspicious circumstances surrounding the
execution of these leases, such circumstances did not equate to a proof of
376. 368 So.2d 984, 993 (La. 1978), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 452 U.S. 571 (1981).
377. Id.
378. See Perrault Memorandum, supra, note 174.
379. Deposition of C.C. Wood, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No.
42,338) at 12 (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
380. It is unclear to the authors of this article why this fact would give someone
pause regarding the validity of the leases, but it is cited by Perrault as a concern
and we thus repeat it here in the interest of completeness.
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the existence of fraud. In order to cancel the leases as of their inception,
fraud would have to be shown. Thus, there must be proof that: (1) fraud
occurred on the part of the present lease holders; or (2) the present lease
holders did not acquire in good faith on the face of the public records.
Thus, in order to examine whether the current holders of the Win or
Lose leases may be forced to give up those leases based on a lack of good
faith, this article looks to the current law on nullity. Louisiana Civil Code
article 2035, provides that: “Nullity of a contract does not impair the rights
acquired through an onerous contract by a third party in good faith. If the
contract involves immovable property, the principles of recordation apply
to a third person acquiring an interest in the property whether by onerous
or gratuitous title.”
According to the 1984 revision comments, “[t]his Article is new, but
it does not change the law.”381 The comments further note that article 2035,
“merely articulates the doctrines of bona fide purchase and the sanctity of
the public records.”382 The article also “reflect[s] the public policy in favor
of security of transactions by protecting the person who acquires rights
through a valid onerous contract from the effects of the nullity of any
related contract between different persons.”383 In fact, this principle has
been part of the Louisiana jurisprudence since the 1800s. In Blanchard v.
Castille, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that, “a bona fide purchaser,
without notice, is not affected by fraud in his vendor, who has a legal title
to the property sold.”384
In State v. Hackley, Hume & Joyce, the State sought to invalidate
patents on certain lands because they were obtained through the use of
fraudulent representations.385 The State’s prayer was that the patents, then
owned by subsequent holders, be decreed to have been illegally obtained.
Further, the State prayed that the patents, together with the titles of the
defendants, be ordered erased from the records, and that the State be
recognized as the owner of the lands and have a judgment rendered against
the defendants ordering them to vacate the disputed property. On
rehearing, the court concluded:

381. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2035, cmt. a.
382. Id. See Mengis, supra note 228 (discussing the importance and sanctity
of public records in such situations).
383. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2035, cmt. b.
384. 19 La. 362, 364 (La. 1841).
385. 50 So. 772 (La. 1909).
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Even though the patent itself should be invalid, by reason of the
alleged fraud of the patentees, the several titles which constitute
the chain of title by which the defendants are alleged to hold may
be good, and each of them be an insurmountable barrier to the
pretensions of the state. This is so because, where fraud has been
committed by the patentee, the government cannot recover the
land from a third person who has acquired it for valuable
consideration and without notice of the fraud. Therefore, for
showing a cause of action against the defendants, it was necessary
that the petition should have shown that the acquisition of the
property under each and every one of these several titles was
without valuable consideration, or else with notice of the alleged
fraud; in other words, connected these subsequent holders of the
title with the fraud by proper allegations, and the petition has not
made this showing.

*

*

*

To say that the defendants are holders in bad faith is not to allege
a fact, but merely a conclusion of law. It is merely to say that their
title is invalid, and that they know it. A ‘holder in bad faith’ is
defined by the Civil Code to be he ‘who possesses as master, but
who assumes this quality when he well knows that he has no title
to the thing or that his title is vicious or defective.’ Civ. Code, art.
3452.386
Notably, bad faith is never presumed;387 thus, good faith is
presumed.388 To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to prove that
the purchaser acted in bad faith because he had knowledge of the
fraudulent circumstances involving the original transaction:
If there is doubt as to the validity of the title from whom he
acquires, or if the person so acquiring title has knowledge of such
facts as would render the title invalid, he cannot claim the benefit
of a possessor in good faith.389

386. Id. at 775 (internal citations omitted).
387. See Breaux v. Broussard, 40 So. 639, 640 (La. 1906).
388. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3481.
389. Franks v. Scott, 191 So. 175, 177 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1939) (citing Knight v.
Berwick Lumber Co., 57 So. 900 (La. 1912); Fradella v. Pumilia, 147 So. 496 (La.
1933), rev’d on other grounds; Rauschkolb v. DiMatteo, 181 So. 555 (La. 1938)).
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The requirement that all of the current right holders in the Win or Lose
leases be shown to have been in bad faith at the time that they acquired
their rights is, in some cases, impossible (due to the death of the acquirers);
and in others, highly unlikely (most of the parties to these leases today
relied in good faith on the public records that suggested or demonstrated
that these leases were valid).
With regard to the “good faith acquirers” mitigating factor, the past
actions of the State Mineral Board, the Louisiana Attorney General’s
Office, and private litigants are of great importance. Over time, the State
Mineral Board, whether by resolution or by settlement of litigation, has
ratified the validity of the Win or Lose leases. Whether these ratifications
were sufficient to undo any wrongdoing that occurred in the acquisition of
the leases is immaterial to this inquiry. What is material is the effect that
those actions had on the public records and the perceptions of those who
acquired interests and invested in the Win or Lose leases subsequent to the
ratifications. The effect of the State Mineral Board ratifications cannot be
understated: they put all subsequent acquirers of interests in these leases
on notice that the State has committed itself to the validity of the leases.
Thus, despite any existing rumors of wrongdoing in the granting of these
leases, the public records demonstrate, that these leases were and are valid,
and such an assertion, can be relied upon in good faith. Consequently, as
a result of these public pronouncements, the current acquirers of interests
in these leases are in good faith and their interests cannot be assailed by
revoking the leases due to the presumption of good faith discussed
above.390
If these resolutions were not enough to assuage any concerns of
prospective acquirers of interests in the Win or Lose leases, the several
pronouncements of the Louisiana Attorney General Office certainly also
contribute to the good faith of the current lease interest holders. As is
reviewed at length in Part II(B), past Attorneys General for the State of
Louisiana have examined the Win or Lose leases for irregularities. Some
of these examinations revealed inconsistencies; yet, each of these
examinations resulted in determinations that the inconsistencies were
either unverifiable or that invalidating the Win or Lose leases was
pointless. These decisions, which effectively became public examples of
prosecutorial discretionary decisions not to take action for lack of evidence

390. See, e.g., Keller v. Summers, 187 So. 69, 71 (La. 1939) (“good faith is
always presumed, until the contrary is shown” in commercial transactions);
Caldwell Lands, Inc. v. Cedyco Corp., 980 So.2d 827, 829 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/2/08)
(“Good faith is presumed” in acquisitive prescription scenarios (citing LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 3481)); Cahn Bros. & Redmond, Inc. v. Terrebonne, 289 So.2d
171, 173 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1973) (good faith is presumed in financial transactions).
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of wrongdoing, further bolster the good faith of today’s right holders in
these leases.
Although none of the governmental or private litigation regarding the
Win or Lose leases reached a final judgment by a court, the mere existence
of the suits and their lack of finality further suggest that these leases could
be relied upon as valid. Probably the most important of these cases is the
litigation against Texaco.391 These acts, along with the lack of complete
prosecution of the other cases involving the Win or Lose leases, certainly
stands as a reliable basis for acquiring good faith rights in the Win or Lose
leases by any and all subsequent lease interest holders.
Therefore, even if the State were able to revoke the Win or Lose
mineral leases, it could not invalidate the equitable rights in or effects of
those leases to the good faith third parties who now hold rights in those
leases. The State has continuously received what it contracted for: a 12.5%
(or more) royalty share on any production from the Win or Lose leases.
Thus, revocation of the leases would not result in the release of any acreage
to potential renomination for bid nor in a return of any royalties acquired
by the lessees, their assigns, or their heirs.
C. The Texaco Litigation and its Implications for the Entire Win or Lose
Matter
In the matter of Texaco Inc., et al. v. Louisiana Land and Exploration
Co., et al.,392 the State sued Texaco, Inc. within Texaco’s then-pending
bankruptcy suit, alleging that the latter had violated a 1981 settlement
agreement between the two parties over natural gas pricing disputes. The
State further alleged that Texaco had intentionally underpaid for gas from
other State leases not included in the 1981 settlement.393 More broadly, the
State alleged that Texaco had been underpaying royalties on gas produced
from forty-four State leases for approximately forty years.394 Among the
leases involved in this lawsuit were several leases in which Texaco
acquired an interest from W.T. Burton and/or shares of interests from the

391. See generally discussion infra part V.C.
392. 136 B.R. 658 (M.D. La. 1992).
393. The 1981 litigation was entitled, State of Louisiana, ex rel. William J.
Guste, Jr., et al. v. Texaco, Inc., et al., Docket No. 60,407, Sixteenth Judicial
District Court, St. Mary Parish.
394. Statement of the Case filed by State of Louisiana, Department of Natural
Resources and State Mineral Board, State v. Texaco, Docket No. 88-998-A (M.D.
La., filed Jan. 8, 1989), at 4–5.
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successors of the Win or Lose Corporation.395 Notably, that this case was
not instituted to attack the actions of or to investigate matters related to
W.T. Burton or Win or Lose, but rather to remedy the royalty
underpayment allegations of the State as against Texaco.396 This does not
mean, that the issues related to W.T. Burton and Win or Lose did not come
up during the course of this wide-ranging and complex litigation; they
were simply not the focus of this case or of the 1981 Texaco litigation.397
The Texaco litigation, which was instituted in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, was associated, but not
consolidated, with Texaco’s then-pending bankruptcy proceedings in the
United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York.398
After several years of litigious maneuvering in both the New York and
Louisiana federal courts, the State, Texaco, and several other parties
entered into mediation, which concluded in 1994 and resulted in the
confection of the Texaco Global Settlement Agreement (GSA).399
The GSA, in addition to settling the State’s gas royalty payment
dispute with Texaco over the leases subject to the suit for a payment to the
State of $250 million, also constituted ratification by the State of the leases
395. A bankruptcy filing by Texaco listed State Leases 334, 335, 340, and 341
as State leases in which Texaco had an interest. Exhibit A to Motion of Texaco
Inc. for Order Approving Assumption of Oil and Gas Agreements with State of
Louisiana, or Alternatively, Determining that Certain Oil and Gas Agreements are
Not Executory Contracts or Unexpired Leases for Purposes of Bankruptcy Code
Section 365, In re: Texaco Inc, et al., Docket Nos. 87-B-20142, 87-B-20143, 87B-20144 (S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 15, 1987).
396. See generally Amended and Restated Objection, Amended and Restated
Proof of Claim and Complaint of the State of Louisiana, Texaco Inc., et al. v.
Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., et al., Docket No. 88-998-A (M.D. La., filed
July, 21, 1989).
397. The media reports have referred to this case as an example of Attorney
Generals Guste and Ieyoub’s examination of the Win or Lose allegations that are
the subject of this report and their decisions not to pursue them. As is clearly
evident from the filings in this case, the alleged wrongdoings of W.T. Burton and
the Win or Lose Corporation were not the subject of either this case or of the case
that resulted in the 1981 Texaco settlement.
398. In re: Texaco Inc, et al., Docket Nos. 87-B-20142, 87-B-20143, 87-B20144 (S.D.N.Y.). Louisiana filed its suit prior to Texaco’s bankruptcy filing. See
Statement of the Case, supra note 394, at 5. Texaco did not file its bankruptcy
primarily to avoid liability from Louisiana’s claims. Rather, the bankruptcy was
instituted because Texaco was unable to cover the obligations imposed upon it by
the adverse ruling against it in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
Statement of the Case, supra note 394, at 14–15. With that said, Louisiana’s
counsel on the Texaco litigation directly alleged that the bankruptcy was also filed
in order to avoid certain liabilities under Texaco’s leases, including those owed to
Louisiana for the underpayment of gas royalties. Id. at 15.
399. See Texaco Global Settlement Agreement (1994) (on file with the La.
Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter GSA].
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subject to the suit.400 The effect of this ratification constitutes an
acceptance of the leases and of their terms by the State in 1994. Such an
acceptance creates a strong presumption of estoppel for the State to now
challenge the substance and terms of those leases.401 Importantly, that the
State did not unilaterally ratify these past leases without any consideration.
In reality, the ratification was a necessary requirement for the State to gain
the benefits of the underpaid royalties—the $250 million payment. In
order to benefit from the leases, the State had to recognize and
acknowledge the validity of the leases under which the benefits were to be
obtained. Hence, the ratification of the leases was included as a condition
of the GSA.
Moreover, it would be a mischaracterization to imply that the State
simply ratified the former W.T. Burton and Win or Lose leases (among
others) without any reason or recompense. The reason and recompense
was a quarter of a billion dollars;402 an agreement for Texaco to spend an
additional $152.25 million for further development of the mineral reserves
covered by their leases;403 an agreement for Texaco to release 33,000 acres
from the Lighthouse Point, Mound Point, and Caillou Island Fields;404 and
tightening Texaco’s commitment to adhere to the gas pricing requirements
of the 1981 Compromise Agreement.405
In addition to the confection of the GSA, the Texaco litigation also
resulted in the creation of the Lease Protection Agreement.406 The Lease
Protection Agreement constituted a settlement of certain State claims in
the Texaco litigation against the overriding royalty interest owners for
State Leases 335, 340, and 341. In the settlement, the State reserved the
ability to, under certain circumstances, obtain higher royalty rates from
these interest holders than had originally been bargained-for when these
leases were let. Through this agreement, the State acquired a 20% royalty
rate for any reassigned portions of these three State leases,407 an increase
in the State’s royalty of 7.5% over the original royalty rate for these leases.
400. The cash payment is detailed in the GSA at ¶ 3, and the ratification is
detailed in the GSA at ¶ 9.
401. See, e.g., Frazier v. Harper, 600 So.2d 59, 62 (La. 1992) (noting the
effects of ratification of contracts).
402. GSA at ¶ 3.
403. Id. at ¶ 4.
404. Id. at ¶ 5. The releases from the Lighthouse Point and Mound Point Fields
amounted to releases of acreage from State Lease 340. In addition to these areas,
the State also required Texaco to release portions of the Rabbit Island, West Cote
Blanche Bay, Horseshoe Bayou, and Bayou Sale Fields.
405. Id. at ¶ 7. There were additional concessions by Texaco in the GSA that
are too detailed for a meaningful summarization in this document. The reader is
referred to the actual language of the GSA for this information.
406. Lease Protection Agreement (1994) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
407. See id. at 11.
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In exchange for this higher royalty rate, the State, through the State
Mineral Board, ratified: “State Leases 334, 335, 340, and 341 and all
Subleases thereof, and all sales and assignments of these leases by William
T. Burton and his successors in title which have been approved by the State
Mineral Board . . . .”408
Thus, once again, the State Mineral Board ratified W.T. Burton and
Win or Lose leases and assignments. This ratification effectively makes
these leases, at least as to those individuals in W.T. Burton’s chain of title,
invulnerable by the State today. Further, considering the effects of
undermining or undoing the leases that are discussed below, such a
dissolution may cause more harm than good to the State’s fisc.
VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section examines how the State was injured by the issuance of
the Win or Lose leases. It then analyzes the likelihood of success of the
possible mechanisms for invalidating the Win or Lose leases
A. What Did The State Lose?
Prior to embarking on an analysis of the possible legal theories to
undermine or cancel the Win or Lose leases and their chances for success,
it is crucial to understand what the State has lost through these leases. In
other words, the question remains how the State fisc (and, presumably by
extension, the people) has been injured by the letting of the Win or Lose.
The very simple answer to this is: nothing. As can be seen in the clear
language of the leases, the State received from these leases a one-eighth
(12.5%) royalty share. This royalty share is consistent with historic leases
at the time. In addition, the consistency of this amount with that of leases
at the time—a 12.5% royalty for the State—was the State-mandated
royalty minimum.409 Thus, not only were the royalty amounts for these
leases consistent with historic standards, they were also consistent with the
legally required royalty at the time.410 Thus, under the law and custom of
408. Id.
409. Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606-07.
410. A significant fact, as found by Daryl Purpera, is that the average royalty
rate for the time period of 1920-1939 was 13.0%–an insubstantial difference from
the 12.5% of the subject leases. DARYL G. PURPERA, Louisiana Legislative
Auditor, STATE MINERAL AND ENERGY BOARD MINERAL LEASE
ROYALTY RATES INFORMATIONAL REPORT, 2 (2013). This reality
suggests that even though 12.5% was the legal minimum at the time, the subject
leases were not let at the bare minimum based upon some side agreement among
the relevant parties, but rather they were let at the minimum just like most other
leases of their time, regardless of the lessor.
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the time, the State received no less than what it was due under the law for
these leases. In short, there was no injury to the State fisc in the letting of
the subject leases and therefore fraud did not, ipso facto, occur in these
cases.
Further, under the aforementioned Lease Protection Agreement,
entered into by the State and several other parties to State Lease 340 in
1994, the State’s royalty share for portions of certain Win or Lose leases
has substantially increased.411 As noted above, the original royalty
percentage received by the State for the Win or Lose leases was 12.5%.
Under the Lease Protection Agreement, any acreage that is reassigned
subsequent to the execution of that Agreement is subject to a 60% increase
in favor of the State (i.e., adding 7.5% to the existing 12.5% royalty, for a
total of a 20% royalty share). With regard to State Lease 340, not all of
that lease’s remaining acreage has been reassigned under the Lease
Protection Agreement since 1994, but the majority of it has. Because of
this Agreement, of the 75,640 unreleased acres still held by State Lease
340, 41,320 of those acres (or 54.63%) are paying out royalties to the State
at 20%, while 34,320 of those acres (or 45.37%) are still paying out at the
original 12.5%. This important reality means that it is very difficult to say
that the State fisc is being injured by the continued existence of State Lease
340. Further, because the State received its statutory royalty due (12.5%)
prior to the execution of the Lease Protection Agreement, it is similarly
difficult to say that the State fisc was injured by State Lease 340 between
1936 and 1994.
This finding and conclusion leads necessarily to the question or what
is left to sue for with regard to the Win or Lose leases. The answer to this
question is not one that has the support of any identifiable legal theory.
The only thing that the State could sue for as to the subject leases is for the
hypothetical idea that, had the State not leased to Noe or Burton, it would
have enjoyed a better royalty rate offered by some other bidder. In other
words, during the gubernatorial terms of Oscar K. Allen and James A.
Noe, today the State would have to show that it would have received a
more advantageous bid than what it received for the Win or Lose leases in
order to even begin to call into question the propriety of the letting of these
leases. This task is impossible. Additionally, such a conclusion is not
supported by the facts from the time. As the Louisiana Legislative Auditor
has recently found, the average royalty rate at the time was 13%.412 Thus,
the 12.5% that the State received was unlikely to have been outbid or
beaten by another bidder during Allen’s or Noe’s terms as governor.

411. Lease Protection Agreement, supra note 406.
412. Purpera, supra note 410, at 2.
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Based upon these realities, this article concludes that, considering the
evidence, the State of Louisiana was not swindled and was not cheated by
the Win or Lose transactions. The State received what was legally required
and customarily due at the time. There is no doubt that the lessees and their
assigns and heirs have profited from the Win or Lose leases. There is also
no question that other lessees have similarly profited in the 103 years that
the State has been leasing its lands for mineral exploration and production.
This profiting is part of the trade-off of mineral development. The
landowner, private or public, reserves (where allowed by law) a share of
the proceeds realized from the minerals derived from its land and the
lessee, as the party bearing the burden of developing the minerals, retains
the remainder of the proceeds. Whether and how these proceeds are
divided among lessees, assignees, overriding interest holders, and others
is strictly a private matter of no concern to the State. Therefore,
considering the leases at issue, as long as the State receives its share of the
royalties as required by law and contract (i.e., its State leases), the State
has not been injured with respect to the Win or Lose leases.
B. Likelihood for Success
Most of the legal theories in this article that propose mechanisms for
the invalidation of Win or Lose leases are untested and, admittedly, are
confected on weak legal bases. Very simply, there is no legal theory to
undo the actions of W.T. Burton, Oscar K. Allen, and James A. Noe, nor
is it clear that it is in the State’s bests interests to do so. Much of the reason
for the weaknesses of these theories is the much-belabored lack of
evidence in this matter necessary to support, much less to prove, a cause
of action. In addition to the lack of a clearly applicable legal theory in this
situation, there is no smoking gun in this matter. The question of whether
the triumvirate of Huey Long, Oscar Allen, and James Noe colluded with
William Burton to obtain vast mineral leases on State property is a
compelling question that can and has led to massive amounts of
speculation. However, the speculation and insinuation of conspiracy
theories does not equate to evidence sufficient to prove a case in a court of
law. No documentary evidence has been identified that can serve as a basis
for invalidating the Win or Lose leases.
Whether there is enough information available to create a claim to
invalidate the subject leases is unclear. Virtually anything can serve as the
basis for a lawsuit, whether it is well founded or not. However, as this
article has set forth above, insinuation and innuendo do not rise to the level
of proof sufficient to support the legal theories available for the
invalidation of the Win or Lose leases. Evidence would have to be real and
clear. Such evidence has not been identified in such a manner that, as of
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today, we can say that the State has a cause of action against the lessees,
assignees, and overriding interest holders in the Win or Lose leases.
Indeed, the available evidence suggests that the Win or Lose leases
were granted in compliance with the law in force at the time rather than
through a nefarious scheme to defraud the State. This reality leads to a
necessary consideration of one of the apparent motivations for seeking to
invalidate the Win or Lose leases in the allegations and stories that led to
the creation of this article: the idea that it is somehow unfair that the
descendants of Long, Allen, and Noe are profiting today off of actions
taken by their ancestors four generations ago. This reality can understanbly
cause frustration, envy, and consternation for modern Louisianans who
happen not to be descendants of these individuals. However, the simple
concept that this reality is unfair is not a legal basis for invalidating
otherwise lawful leases. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted,
“[e]quitable considerations and estoppel cannot be permitted to prevail
when in conflict with the positive written law.”413 In other words, the
perception that the State was cheated by way of the Win or Lose leases, in
the absence of any evidence to support such claims, cannot overcome the
reality that the subject leases were issued in compliance with the thenexisting law. The State, under Louisiana Supreme Court precedent, cannot
simply invalidate otherwise valid leases merely because the citizens are
now unhappy that the Longs, Allens, and Noes continue to profit from
these leases.
This does not mean that, should the State opt to bring an action to
invalidate the active Win or Lose leases, that it might not be successful.
However, based on the reality that the State has not lost any royalties on
these leases and based on the lack of evidence and the weakness of the
available legal theories, any such suit will be, legally, virtually impossible
and practically unwise.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis, it is not recommended that a suit be filed on this
matter. The costs are simply too high for a speculative and doubtful return.
Such a suit does not appear to be in the best interests of the State. In the
exercise of its fiduciary duty, the State must not only consider the potential
sins of the past, but also the effects of any prospective actions taken with
regard to the Win or Lose leases. There is little doubt that a legal swipe at
the heirs of the Win or Lose fortune would seem to cure a perceived (but
not proven) moral injustice. However, as is noted above, the costs of such
413. Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu Parish, 561
So.2d 482, 488–89 (La. 1990).
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an action could be significant and may result in substantial negative
financial impacts to the State. Further, many of the mineral rights that
originally began as part of the Win or Lose matter are now in the hands of
third parties with no involvement in the original acquisitions of these
interests. The disturbance of these parties’ rights would likely be rebuffed
by the courts or would constitute contractual interferences for which the
State could be financially liable.414

414. The former possibility is based upon the discussion of the rights of good
faith third parties. The latter possibility refers to the general tort theories related
to the interference with a contract or a business relationship. See, e.g., 9 to 5
Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So.2d 228 (La. 1989); Tech. Control Sys., Inc. v.
Green, 809 So.2d 1204 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/27/02), writ denied, 817 So.2d 100 (La.
5/31/02); Bogues v. La. Energy Consultants, Inc., 71 So.3d 1128 (La. App. 2 Cir.
8/10/11).

